ADR in B2B disputes in the EU telecommunications sector : where does the EU stand and what does the EU stand for? by WARWAS, Barbara Alicja
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
LAW 2014/12 
Department of Law 
European Regulatory Private Law Project (ERC-ERPL-09)  
European Research Council (ERC) Grant 
ADR in B2B Disputes in the EU Telecommunications 
Sector: Where Does the EU Stand and What Does the 
EU Stand for? 
 
Barbara Alicja Warwas 
Barbara Alicja Warwas 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
   
European University Institute 
Department of Law 
“European Regulatory Private Law” Project 
European Research Council (ERC) Grant 
 
ADR in B2B Disputes in the EU Telecommunications Sector: 
Where Does the EU Stand and What Does the EU Stand for? 
 
Barbara Alicja Warwas 
 
EUI Working Paper LAW 2014/12 
ERC-ERPL-09 
 
 
Barbara Alicja Warwas 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This text may be downloaded for personal research purposes only. Any additional reproduction for 
other purposes, whether in hard copy or electronically, requires the consent of the author(s), editor(s). 
If cited or quoted, reference should be made to the full name of the author(s), editor(s), the title, the 
working paper or other series, the year, and the publisher. 
 
ISSN 1725-6739 
 
© 2014 Barbara Alicja Warwas 
Printed in Italy 
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana 
I – 50014 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy 
www.eui.eu 
cadmus.eui.eu 
  
European Regulatory Private Law: The Transformation of European Private Law from 
Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation (ERPL) 
 
A 60 month European Research Council grant has been awarded to Prof. Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz  for 
the project “European Regulatory Private Law: the Transformation of European Private Law from 
Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation” (ERPL).  
The focus of the socio-legal project lies in the search for a normative model which could shape a self-
sufficient European private legal order in its interaction with national private law systems. The project 
aims at a new–orientation of the structures and methods of European private law based on its 
transformation from autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation. It suggests the 
emergence of a self-sufficient European private law, composed of three different layers (1) the 
sectorial substance of ERPL, (2) the general principles – provisionally termed competitive contract 
law – and (3) common principles of civil law. It elaborates on the interaction between ERPL and 
national private law systems around four normative models: (1) intrusion and substitution, (2) conflict 
and resistance, (3) hybridisation and (4) convergence. It analyses the new order of values, enshrined in 
the concept of access justice (Zugangsgerechtigkeit). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Research Council under 
the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP/2007–2013) / ERC Grant Agreement 
n. [269722]. 
 
Barbara Alicja Warwas 
 6 
Author contact details 
Dr. Barbara Alicja Warwas 
Brunel University London 
Barbara.Warwas@eui.eu  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ADR in B2B Disputes in the EU Telecommunications Sector 
 
 7 
Abstract 
This paper analyses the application of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms to disputes 
arising between telecommunications undertakings under the EU Telecommunications Package, as 
revised on November 4, 2009. The new rules aimed at facilitating the development of the EU common 
telecommunications market, and were designed to increase the powers of national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs) across the Member States in the imposition of regulatory obligations in a coherent 
manner. One key reform concerned the centralisation of the dispute resolution functions of NRAs. 
Within the new dispute resolution prerogatives, NRAs were empowered with a right to determine their 
appropriateness for handling regulatory disputes between telecommunications undertakings or to 
decline their jurisdiction should other ADR means be available and more suitable for the resolution of 
regulatory disputes. This paper examines the mere development of ADR in telecommunications 
disputes in the UK, Ireland and Poland following the revision of the EU Telecommunications Package. 
Moreover, the paper analyses the effectiveness of the recent European Union (EU) policy on 
promoting ADR within the EU legal order against the background of the fragmented national 
approaches to ADR, as examined in the selected jurisdictions. 
Keywords 
 
ADR in EU regulated markets, EU Telecom Package, shifting legitimacy of arbitration and ADR, 
business-to-business telecommunications disputes, NRAs   
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Introduction 
 
This paper analyses the application of ADR mechanisms to disputes arising between 
telecommunications undertakings under the EU Telecommunications Package (EU Telecom Package), 
as revised on November 4, 2009. The new rules aimed at facilitating the development of the EU 
common telecommunications market, and were designed to increase the powers of national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs) across the Member States in the imposition of regulatory obligations in a coherent 
manner. One key reform concerned the centralisation of the dispute resolution functions of NRAs. 
Within the new dispute resolution prerogatives, NRAs were empowered with a right to determine their 
appropriateness for handling regulatory disputes between telecommunications undertakings or to 
decline their jurisdiction, in particular with regard to the availability (and suitability) of ADR means 
for the resolution of regulatory disputes.  
 
 Against this background, the purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it intends to understand 
the new design of the dispute resolution framework under the revised EU Telecom Package together 
with the objectives underpinning the introduction of ADR mechanisms by means of the recent 
reforms. In this vein, this paper also examines the possible ambiguities resulting from the new dispute 
resolution framework in the EU telecommunications sector. The second part of this paper analyses the 
national approaches to the new provisions on dispute resolution as contained in the EU Telecom 
Package, specifically focusing on the various attitudes towards the suitability of ADR methods as 
expressed by the NRAs in the UK, Ireland, and Poland. Here, as a corollary, the paper also aims at 
understanding the origins of telecommunications disputes that may be particularly suitable for ADR, 
on one hand, and the types of ADR mechanisms that are preferred for the resolution of such disputes 
by the NRAs in the studied jurisdictions, on the other hand.  
 
A further goal underlying the second part of this paper is to understand the rationality of the 
European Union (EU) underpinning the introduction of ADR within the telecommunications sectors in 
the context of recent renewed interest in arbitration and other forms of ADR at the EU level. The EU 
has increasingly begun to adopt policies on promoting arbitration and different ADR schemes. This 
involves: (1) the procedure for the recasting of the Brussels I Regulation; (2) the debate regarding the 
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms in the EU International Investment Agreements 
following the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty; and (3) the introduction of a number of ADR and 
online dispute resolution (ODR) schemes for consumer disputes. Although the advantages of ADR are 
straightforward, the changing EU policy regarding arbitration entails intriguing questions on the 
private-public interplay in the EU sectorial disputes in view of the shifting nature of legitimacy of 
arbitration and ADR. These issues have been examined in detail by this author in her Ph.D. thesis 
which, among other things, addressed the emerging public function of arbitration.
1
 The public function 
of arbitration concerns, inter alia, the shift towards the integration of highly sensitive public policy 
issues into arbitration. In this view, the paper also locates ADR in the EU telecommunications sectors 
vis-à-vis both the emerging public function of arbitration and the recent increasing private-public 
interplay in the field of ADR within the EU legal order. 
 
Regarding the selection of case studies, the range of jurisdictions differs from the original 
intent of the author. Originally, the choice of jurisdictions was prompted by the necessity to provide a 
comprehensive analysis of different approaches to ADR across a wider group of the EU Member 
States. However, the author quickly noticed a persistent fragmentation in terms of national approaches 
to ADR effectively necessitating a different methodological approach hinging on the explanation of 
the most conflicting and indeed radical stances to alternative means of dispute resolution in the EU 
                                                     
1 Warwas, Barbara Alicja, The Three Pillars of Institutional Arbitral Liability: The Weaknesses of Current Regulations and 
Proposals for Further Reform, Ph.D. thesis, Florence: European University Institute 2013. 
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telecommunication sectors. Therefore, the author decided to address the jurisdictions in which the 
implementation of the EU Telecom Package have indeed advanced the applicability of alternative 
means to regulatory disputes (such as the UK and Ireland), on one hand, and the Member State where 
the legislative actions somewhat disregarded the EU increasing trust in ADR such as Poland, on the 
other hand.  
 
Finally, the significant limitations regarding the research on the resolution of business-to-
business telecommunication (B2B) disputes should be stressed here. Although certain parts of this 
paper refer to data collected by means of interviews with practitioners, academics and members of 
NRA dealing with telecommunications law (such as the Section on Poland), the empirical data related 
to the EU telecommunications disputes in general is rather scarce. This is a function of, among other 
things, the confidentiality of ADR, specifically when conducted by traditional commercial service 
providers that do not publish statistical data on the actual participation of telecommunications 
companies in ADR proceedings. 
1.1. Dispute Resolution Framework in the EU Telecom Package 
 
National provisions on dispute resolution in the telecommunications sector in all EU Member States 
stem from the regulations contained in the 2002 EU electronic communication package, as revised in 
2009 and now commonly referred to as the EU Telecom Package.
2
 Specifically, two Directives from 
the EU Telecom Package establish a dispute resolution framework that applies to undertakings 
providing communications services or networks, namely: Directive 2002/21/EC of 7 March 2002 on a 
common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (the Framework 
Directive) and Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications 
networks and associated facilities of 7 March 2002  (the Access and Interconnection Directive), as 
amended by Directive 2009/140/EC of 25 November 2009.
3
 The provisions setting out dispute 
resolution relating to telecommunications operators within the same Member States are contained in 
Article 20 of the Framework Directive and are crossed-referenced in recital 19 to the Access and 
Interconnection Directive.  
Based on these provisions, in the event of a dispute arising in connection with obligations 
stemming from the Framework Directive or any other Directive constituting part of the EU Telecom 
Package, the NRAs should issue a binding decision to resolve a dispute within the shortest time frame 
possible, and in any case within four months of a dispute being submitted to them save from 
exceptional circumstances.
4
  Dispute resolution procedure conducted by a relevant NRA should be 
issued at the request of either of the parties involved. An NRA—if permitted by relevant national 
provisions—may refuse to hear a dispute should other mechanisms such as mediation exist that may 
be more suitable for an expeditious and effective resolution of the dispute in accordance with the 
objectives set forth in Article 8 of the Framework Directive.
5
 If this is the case, the NRA should dully 
inform the parties to the dispute. If after four months the dispute is not resolved through alternative 
methods, the parties may refer it back to the NRA that will then issue a binding decision in resolution 
of the dispute within the following four months. The dispute is to be resolved in line with the policy 
                                                     
2 The EU Telecom Package contains a numer of rules to be implemented by the EU Member States. See the explanation of 
Telecoms Rules on the European Commission (EC) website at: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/telecoms-rules.  
3 OJ L 108, 24 April 2002 and OJ L 337, 18 December 2009, accordingly. 
4 See: Article 20 of the Framework Directive.  
5 Article 8 of the Framework Directive confirms the Community requirements regarding the functionality of the 
telecommunications sector that have been designed to foster effective competition in the provision of telecommunications 
network, services and associated facilities and services; to enhance the development of the internal market; and to 
promote the interests of the citizens in the EU. 
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and regulatory objectives as enumerated in the aforementioned Article 8 of the Framework Directive. 
The decision should be made public while simultaneously respecting the principle of business 
confidentiality. In any case, the parties retain the right to bring an action before a national court, and 
so regulatory dispute resolution of telecommunications disputes including alternative means remains 
only complementary to judicial proceedings. Although Article 20 of the Framework Directive does not 
hinder the parties’ right to go to court, the positions of national courts in the jurisdictions studied in 
this paper regarding the mere interplay between ADR and court actions have not yet been confirmed.
6
   
Additionally, Recital 32 to the Framework Directive complements the understanding of 
Article 20 of the same Directive. It does so by way of specifying both the rights of the aggrieved party 
after a dispute arises and the obligation of NRAs to resolve a referred dispute: 
32. In the event of a dispute between undertakings in the same Member State […] an aggrieved 
party that has negotiated in good faith but failed to reach agreement should be able to call on the 
national regulatory authority to resolve the dispute. National regulatory authorities should be able 
to impose a solution on the parties. The intervention of a national regulatory authority in the 
resolution of a dispute between undertakings providing electronic communications networks or 
services in a Member State should seek to ensure the compliance with the obligations arising out 
of this [Framework] Directive or the Specific Directives.     
Furthermore, Recital 19 to the Access and Interconnection Directive entitles the aggrieved parties 
whose access to, or the use of, the network infrastructure have been denied to rely on dispute 
resolution mechanisms provided for in Article 20 of the Framework Directive. In sum, the EU 
Telecom Package introduces broad authority of national regulators in the so-called “official” 
resolution of telecommunications disputes and it allows the NRAs wide discretion when deciding on 
whether to hear a dispute or to submit it to an alternative forum. Both advantages and disadvantages of 
the changes adopted in the EU Telecom Package can be identified. The former relate, inter alia, to the 
elimination of the limitations to the powers of NRAs to resolve disputes concerning interconnection 
that were in place under the previous EU telecommunications regime,
7
 while the latter involve the 
issues discussed in Section 1.3 of this paper.     
 
The reformed EU Telecom Package provides for appeal mechanisms against the decisions of 
NRAs in the resolution of telecommunications disputes. Pursuant to Article 4 of the Framework 
Directive such appeal proceedings should take place before a court or other independent body and 
should be conducted effectively with regard to the merits of a dispute. If appeal proceedings lead to 
unsatisfactory solutions, the decision of the NRA stands. The appeal procedure is oriented towards 
                                                     
6 Recently, some authors have criticised the introduction of ADR and ODR schemes into business-to-consumer disputes at 
the EU level. The criticism has focused on the potential impaired access to the court system for consumers - an implied 
risk accompanying the outsourcing of mandatory consumer rights to private dispute resolution fora. See Eidenmüller, 
Horst and Engel, Martin, “Against False Settlement: Designing Efficient Consumer Rights Enforcement Schemes in 
Europe,” forthcoming. The potential risks regarding the parties’ right to access to the courts have been examined in detail 
by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in Alassini and others v Telecom Italia SpA (Joined Cases C-
317/08 to C-320/08 [2010] ECR I-2213). The CJEU analysed whether Italian law, requiring that consumers rely on 
mandatory online conciliation prior to initiating court proceedings, infringed the provisions of Article 34 of the Universal 
Service Directive. In the judgement in question, the CJEU did not find the mandatory settlement procedure contrary to 
the provisions of the Universal Service Directive, as—in view of the CJEU—such procedure did not affect the rights of 
individual parties to a dispute due to the non-binding nature of the conciliation scheme in question which did not 
prejudice the parties’ right to bring the case in front of a court nor did it impose additional costs on the parties. Against 
this background, it is yet unclear what implications the encouragement of ADR in B2B telecommunications disputes will 
have on exercising the right to access to court proceedings by business parties.           
7 See the case studies regarding the limited regulatory powers in resolution of certain types of disputes under the previous EU 
communications framework in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, as explained in Annetje Ottow, “Dispute 
Resolution Under the European Framework,” pp. 5-7. The paper can be downloaded at: 
http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/ottow/disputeresolutionundertheneweuframework.PDF.  
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ensuring fair and accurate resolution of regulatory disputes in light of the effectiveness of the 
enforcement of regulatory adjudication. The courts are still commonly involved in judicial review of 
the NRAs’ decisions but there are also other bodies to whom the parties may recourse in challenging 
regulatory decisions. These dynamics are illustrated in Figure 1 below.
8
  
Figure 1: To whom can parties appeal against a regulator’s decision:  
 
 
 
 
Regarding the resolution of cross-border telecommunications disputes within the EU, a particular 
procedure was introduced in Article 21 of the Framework Directive largely mirroring the dispute 
resolution mechanisms designed for national disputes. First, NRAs are obliged to coordinate their 
efforts to ensure the consistency of their decision-making processes. Second, and in line with Article 
20 of the Framework Directive, the usage of ADR methods is acknowledged with regard to cross-
border disputes by allowing NRAs to jointly decline the resolution of disputes should other methods 
be more suitable for a fast determination of a dispute. Article 21.3 of the Framework Directive also 
provides for a time frame of four months within which a dispute should be resolved by means of 
alternative methods, and it authorizes NRAs to take over a dispute and resolve it in a binding fashion 
should the alternative means lead to an unsatisfactory solution.    
 
Together with the introduction of the new Directive 2009/140/EC of 25 November 2009, a 
new Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) has been created in order 
to coordinate and harmonise the cross-border dispute resolution practices among the Member States. 
BEREC is charged with the competence of issuing an opinion concerning the action to be taken by a 
competent NRA in accordance with the provisions of the Framework Directive and/or the Specific 
Directives falling within the EU Telecom Package upon a request submitted to BEREC by a 
competent authority. Upon making such a request, the NRA should await BEREC’s opinion before 
taking any action to resolve the dispute unless there is a need for the NRA to take urgent measures. 
The first meeting of BEREC took place in January 2010.
9
 
 
Some commentators claim that the provisions of Article 21 of the Framework Directive on 
cross-border dispute resolution—although interesting from an academic perspective—have little 
practical relevance because most disputes arising out of, or in relation to, the allocation of market 
power or the barriers to entry are purely national in their nature.
10
 This can also be attributed to the 
                                                     
8  Source: Rory Macmillan, “Effective Dispute Resolution: A Pressing Priority for Policy-Makers and Regulators,” ITU 
News 10/2004, pp. 26-29, available at:  
http://www.itu.int/itunews/manager/display.asp?lang=en&year=2004&issue=10&ipage=dispute&ext=html. 
9 ICT Toolkit, Practice Note 3281 on the “EU Telecoms Reform Package [1],” at: 
http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/toolkit/notes/practicenote/3281.  
10 See Paul Brisby, “Dispute Resolution in Telecoms – The Regulatory Perspective”, Computer and Telecommunications 
Law Review, 2005, Vol. 11, no. 1., pp. 4-9, p. 2. 
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historical organisation of monopolies at national levels.
11
 This observation is certainly drawn from the 
perspective of a national regulatory regime and it seems to be in opposition to the objectives of the EU 
Telecom Package, in particular as enshrined in Article 8 of the Framework Directive. Such 
observation is, however, telling as it attests to the continued gap between, on the one hand, the many 
national regulatory systems characterised by self-orientation and fragmentation and, on the other hand, 
EU policy in the area of telecommunications that, in turn, recognizes the dynamics of the globalized 
telecommunication market and aims at facilitating its development beyond national borders.
12
  
 
Additionally, as rightly observed by Annetje Ottow, the procedure established in Article 21 of 
the Framework Directive is noteworthy because it implies a number of intriguing legal questions that 
may have important practical implications for the resolution of cross-border telecommunications 
disputes.
13
 These questions concern the following: prospective cooperation between national 
regulators, the exchange of confidential information and the treatment of business secrets or the 
possible interventions of a NRA from one Member State in the proceedings conducted in another 
Member State in case of disagreement with the outcome of a dispute.
14
   
1.2. Community Objectives Underpinning the EU Dispute Resolution Framework in 
Telecommunications 
 
In order to better understand the powers of NRAs in the resolution of disputes as well as the objectives 
of ADR under the reformed EU Telecom Package, it is relevant to examine the goals of the European 
Commission associated with the new regulatory framework in the telecommunications sector. The 
reforms were required as a result of the need for continuous liberalisation of telecommunications 
markets and for the sake of enhancing the effectiveness of telecommunications regulations at national 
levels in a harmonized manner. On many occasions, the Commission pointed to the necessity for 
NRAs to become empowered with clear, comprehensive and broad authority to issue timely and 
coherent decisions in the resolution of regulatory disputes.
15
 The Commission also referred to the need 
for setting forth effective procedures for appeals against NRAs decisions that should in no case 
obstruct regulatory adjudication. The EU Telecom Package was meant to minimise both the delays 
and arbitrariness in decision-making that threatened the existence of the meaningful regulation in the 
telecommunications sector.   
 
 For this reason, the new EU Telecom Package centralised the regulatory, decision-making 
functions of NRAs by way of introducing provisions on “official” and “unofficial” dispute resolution 
mechanism. Official dispute resolution has been left to NRAs in the form of regulatory adjudication. 
Unofficial means have been “outsourced” to other, private fora under the supervisory powers of 
national regulators. There is little guidance, however, on the exact Community objectives in terms of 
reliance on ADR. What can be drawn from the aforementioned Community concerns related to dispute 
resolution can be summarized from the following goals: 
 
- Flexible and timely resolution of suitable disputes; 
- Effectiveness of ADR procedures in certain types of disputes; 
- Legal certainty of dispute resolution processes. 
                                                     
11 Ibid.  
12 See Mads Adenas, Stefan Zleptnig, Telecommunications Dispute Resolution: Procedure and Effectiveness, BIICL, 
February 2004, available at: http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/ottow/BIICL_Telecoms_%20Report_%202004.pdf.    
13 Annetje Ottow, “Dispute Resolution Under the European Framework,” p. 10. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Eight Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the Telecommunications Regulatory Package European 
telecoms regulation and markets 2002 COM (2002)696 (2002) cited by Annetje Ottow, in: Ibid, p. 3-4  
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Such objectives may serve as a useful hint towards a better understanding of the terminology 
under the EU Telecom Package as well as the applicability of the alternative mechanisms for the 
resolution of disputes between telecommunications undertakings. These issues will be discussed in 
Section 2.3 of this paper.     
1.3. Understanding the Practicalities of the Dispute Resolution Framework as Set Forth 
in the EU Telecom Package: On Definitions 
 
Several ambiguities arise in relation to the introduction of the dispute resolution framework in the EU 
Telecom Package. First, neither the Framework Directive nor any other Directive falling within the 
EU legislative framework on telecommunications contains a definition of the word “dispute”. This has 
implications for the national telecommunications laws, in particular of the jurisdictions studied in this 
paper, which in no case expressly define what a “dispute” actually means or should imply. Such 
ambiguity results in uncertainty for the parties to potential disputes, especially in view of the broad 
discretion of NRAs in assessing the “appropriateness” of available alternative means to handle certain 
disputes. The Discussion Paper on Dispute Resolution in the Telecommunications Sector prepared for 
the International Telecommunications Unit (ITU) and the World Bank in October 2004 (the ITU 
Discussion Paper) has adopted a guiding, broad notion of the term “dispute” encompassing both 
formal procedures where claims or complaints are brought by the parties and the conflicting interests 
of the parties—even in cases where no formal disputes arise—that affect the dynamics of the regulated 
telecommunications industry.
16
       
The second source of confusion relates to the wording of Article 20 of the Framework 
Directive in that it is extremely broad making reference to any dispute that may arise between the 
telecommunications undertakings in relation to the obligations under the Framework Directive in 
particular and the EU Telecom Package in general. Paul Brisby argues that these obligations would 
usually entail Significant Market Power (SMP) conditions imposed by national regulators on market 
players after a scrupulous market analysis.
17
 Brisby also points to somewhat more general obligations, 
being a plausible cause of disputes, that derive from Articles 4(1) and 5(4) of the Access and 
Interconnection Directive, such as the obligations requiring the operators of communications networks 
to negotiate interconnection upon a request, or simply “anything relating to access and interconnection 
in the field of interconnections networks.”18   
The ITU Discussion Paper serves as a useful tool for identifying the subject matter of 
“common” disputes in the telecommunications sector.19  Such disputes usually fall within the 
following categories: (1) disputes related to liberalisation; (2) investment and trade disputes; (3) 
interconnection disputes; and (4) radio frequency disputes.
20
 The first category of disputes 
concerning liberalisation relates to the reduction or termination of the incumbents’ exclusive rights 
vis-à-vis the incumbents’ desire to maintain their dominant position within the market.21 The second 
group involves investment and trade disputes and deals with disputes raised by investors, operators 
                                                     
16 “Dispute Resolution in the Telecommunications Sector: Current Practices and Future Disrections,” Discussion Paper 
prepared by Robert R. Bruce, Rory Macmillan, Timothy St. J. Ellam, Hank Intven, and Theresa Miedema for ITU and 
World Bank, Published in February 2006, available at: http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/treg/publications/ITU_WB_Dispute_Res-E.pdf, p. 3. 
17 Paul Brisby, “Dispute Resolution in Telecoms – The Regulatory Perspective,” p. 5. 
18 Ibid. 
19 ITU Discussion Paper, Chapter 3. 
20 This distinction serves only as guidance and, in no way, claims to be exhaustive. Ibid.  
21 ITU Discussion Paper, Chapter 3. 
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and service providers over “early termination of exclusive rights, licensing of new competitors, new 
rate-setting structures and changes to licenses.”22 As stated in the ITU Discussion Paper, investment 
and trade disputes also entail contractual or alleged breaches of legal or policy requirements as a 
function of heavy-handed regulatory intervention.
23
 These disputes are increasingly internationally-
oriented, with investment disputes arising out of or in connection with bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) and trade disputes stemming from the World Trade Organization trade regime and the 
obligations enshrined in the General Agreement on Trade in Services and related documents.
24
  
Interconnection disputes, falling within the third category, encompass the most frequent type 
of disputes between telecommunications service providers. This is due to the highly sensitive public 
policy issues that such disputes involve mainly because of their impact on competition between 
operators of different types of access networks and the possible abuse of SMP of incumbent operators 
when granting access to new entrants. This is the reason why interconnection disputes attract the 
considerable attention of NRAs. Pursuant to the information provided by the ICT Regulation Toolkit, 
the interconnection disputes may concern various technical, operational, and financial issues.
25
 More 
specifically, they involve the following: 
• Failure by a dominant operator to develop a Reference Interconnection Offer (RIO) or standard 
interconnection arrangements; 
• Failure to conclude negotiations on a timely basis; 
• Disagreement on interconnection charges; 
• Disputes over quality of interconnection services; 
• Failure to comply with the terms of a negotiated interconnection agreement; 
• Poaching of customers by new entrants through improper customer transfers i.e., slamming; and 
• Improper use of competitively sensitive customer information by incumbent operators.
26
 
It is sufficient to stress the potential moment of emergence of interconnection disputes. The 
interconnection disputes usually arise either at the stage of negotiating interconnection agreements or 
when interconnection agreements are further implemented and executed.
27
  
Finally, the last category of disputes concerns radio frequency disputes that may emerge at 
domestic or international level. As explained in the ITU Discussion Paper, domestic disputes of this 
kind may originate in harmful interference or spectrum reframing, license conditions, and pricing.
28
 
International radio frequency disputes are handled by the ITU through the Radiocommunications 
Bureau (known as ITU-B).
29
  
                                                     
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid. 
24 “Functional Aspects of Regulation”, ITU downloadable paper at www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/sectionexport/word/6.6. 
Given the international nature of these disputes, the analysis of such disputes falls outside the scope of this paper. 
25 See: ICT Regulatory Toolkit, Practice Note 2560 on the “Interconnection disputes”, available at: 
http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/toolkit/notes/PracticeNote/2560.  
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. See also: “Functional Aspects of Regulation”, ITU downloadable paper at: 
www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/sectionexport/word/6.6. 
29 “Functional Aspects of Regulation”, ITU downloadable paper at www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/sectionexport/word/6.6. 
Barbara Alicja Warwas 
 8 
Additionally, Rory Macmillan in his Article on ‘Effective Dispute Resolution: A pressing 
priority for policy-makers and regulators’ points out the common range of disputes between 
telecommunications undertakings involving regulatory intervention.
30
 Such disputes originate in the 
following: interconnection, abuse of dominant position, frequency allocation, pricing and numbering, 
service quality and licence fees.
31
  
What emerges from the above distinctions between the common telecommunications disputes 
concerns not only the identification of the origins of disputes as such but also the interplay between 
the scope of regulatory intervention in specific types of disputes and the design of dispute resolution 
mechanisms entailing different approaches to “formality” as adopted in those mechanisms. It is 
speculated that disputes between parties with SMP will, most likely, be subject to regulatory 
adjudication, while disputes between parties with little market power will usually be delegated to 
industry-sponsored dispute resolution schemes that follow the procedures for ordinary resolution of 
commercial disputes.
32
  
This observation leads us to another ambiguity stemming from the dispute resolution 
framework adopted in the EU Telecom Package regarding the unspecific understanding of the 
expression: “other means that would better contribute to the resolution of a dispute in a timely manner 
[emphasis added]” pursuant to Article 20.2 of the Framework Directive. The Framework Directive 
neither explains the exact meaning of, and the types of, the “other means” that would be suitable for 
the resolution of disputes between telecommunications operators nor does it provide for any 
indications on how such suitability should be measured. Article 20 of the Framework Directive 
mentions “mediation” among the alternatives; however, the determination of the accurate means has 
been left to the competent NRA while deciding on whether it is appropriate for it to handle a given 
dispute. When looking at the legal instruments regulating ADR within the EU legal order, particularly 
Directive 2008/52/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2008 on certain 
aspects of mediation in civil and commercial matters, we note that mediation is the most encouraged 
and, at the same time, the most specified form of ADR across the Union. In relation to other EU 
instruments on ADR, including Directive 2013/11/EU on Consumer ADR and Regulation No. 
524/2013 on Consumer ODR of 21 May 2013, no definition of out-of-court procedures to be applied 
to consumer disputes is delineated.
33
 Additionally, these instruments do not specifically determine if 
other, more formal ADR schemes such as arbitration, should fall within the broader understanding of 
extra-judicial, ADR means within the EU. The fact that both the terminology and procedures regarding 
the EU ADR models remain vague in relation to consumer disputes that imply significant public 
policy objectives convolutes the potential standards to be applied by NRAs when determining the 
adaptability and suitability of ADR in telecommunications B2B disputes.   
All of the above prompts certain questions. What are the exact objectives—other than 
expeditiousness and securing the “better” outcomes of disputes—to be considered by NRAs while 
determining the suitability of other dispute resolution means to a pending dispute? What is the impact 
of commercial negotiations, specifically in view of the obligation imposed on the operators of 
communications networks to negotiate the interconnection access under Article 4(1) of the Access and 
Interconnection Directive on the emergence of a dispute within the meaning of Article 20 of the 
                                                     
30 Rory Macmillan, “Effective Dispute Resolution: a Pressing Priority for Policy-Makers and Regulators, p. 26. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., p. 28. See also: Paul Brisby, “Dispute Resolution in Telecoms – The Regulatory Perspective”, p. 5.  
33 Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for 
consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (Directive on consumer 
ADR), OJ L 165/63, 18 June 2013; Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 
May 2013 on online dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and 
Directive 2009/22/EC (Regulation on consumer ODR), OJ L 165/1, 18 June 2013. 
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Framework Directive? When do commercial negotiations end and when does a “proper” dispute 
begin? What are the types of alternative procedures that are in fact suitable for the resolution of 
telecommunications disputes as opposed to regulatory adjudication?  Finally, do the “other,” 
alternative means to be applied to telecommunications disputes in fact bear the resemblance of 
traditional ADR techniques that are broadly used in commercial settings? Most of these questions will 
be addressed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 of this paper. It is sufficient here to preliminary address the 
possible types of ADR procedures to be applied in telecommunications disputes between 
undertakings.  
Most authors, when explaining alternative means of dispute resolution in the 
telecommunications sector mention “traditional” arbitration, on one side of the spectrum and 
mediation or negotiation, on the other. This distinction is made because of different levels of 
procedural “formality” that the above-mentioned mechanisms implicate. Arbitration, on one hand, is 
an increasingly formalized process. In most cases it is conducted in accordance with the particular 
arbitration rules which lead to a binding resolution of a dispute by a private adjudicator or a panel of 
adjudicators called arbitrators. Negotiation and mediation, on the other hand, entail less formal 
techniques related to conflict management methods applied either by parties themselves or by neutral 
parties known as mediators. In view of this distinction, it is alleged that negotiation and mediation can 
be invoked at an early stage of the dispute resolution process, particularly before a dispute is finally 
resolved by a competent national regulator.
34
 On the contrary, arbitration, which offers binding 
outcomes, is an ultimate means for dispute resolution and so its interplay with regulatory adjudication 
(at least in its traditional form) is very limited.    
Although the adaptability of traditional ADR methods to the resolution of telecommunications 
disputes has not given rise to a broader discussion among commentators, one example of so-called 
“final offer arbitration” (FOA)—as explained by Samuel J. Reich—requires particular attention here.35 
FOA encourages prompt settlements and it reduces the input of the parties to a dispute at the ultimate 
arbitration hearings by means of imposing on the parties the acceptance of “win or lose” solutions 
should the need to conduct a hearing arise. In other words, under the standard FOA scheme, the parties 
would meet at a preliminary hearing and agree that in the event of further adversarial discussions an 
arbitrator will issue a final determination in which no room for a compromise will be allowed. FOA is 
a scheme used frequently in the field of U.S. baseball salary arbitration. Samuel J. Reich suggests that 
it could be easily implemented within the telecommunications sector considering the possibility of 
recourse to the final authority of national regulators (charged with confirming the fairness of the 
process). Additionally, he argues that the public interest often involved in telecommunications 
disputes could serve as a deterrent factor in balancing the parties’ rights in the resolution of industry-
specific disputes. This argument is not entirely convincing, especially with regard to the actual finality 
of the arbitrators’ determinations of telecommunications disputes vis-à-vis the broad regulatory 
powers of NRAs. These and other controversies stemming from the prospective use of new forms of 
arbitration and other ADR means in the telecommunications sector will be further discussed in 
Sections 2.2 and 2.3 of this paper. 
There are also other techniques, such as conciliation, that can be used within the 
telecommunications sector. Conciliation, similarly to mediation and negotiation, rarely brings the 
parties to a final and binding resolution of their dispute, as it involves the assistance of a conciliator 
                                                     
34 ITU Discussion Paper, Chapter 3. 
35 Samuel J. Reich, Structuring Baseball's "Final Offer" Arbitration process for use in proceedings before the CRTC: A 
Report, available on the website of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, at: 
http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/publications/reports/reich09.htm; and Practice Note of the ICT Regulation Toolkit on’Final 
Offer Arbitration’ available at the following address: 
http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/toolkit/notes/PracticeNote/3280. 
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who only invites the parties to make concessions to minimise the differences in their understanding 
and handling of a dispute.   
 Some “innovative” approaches to alternative means are also mentioned by commentators in 
relation to telecommunications dispute resolution that include hybrids of official (formal) and 
unofficial (voluntary) methods.
36
 These hybrid schemes provide for the combination of regulatory 
adjudication (that, in these cases, is usually limited to a supervisory intervention) and private and 
informal techniques that derive from the objectives of traditional ADR methods. I propose to call these 
combined, official/unofficial means, “delegated regulatory adjudication,”37 as opposed to pure 
regulatory dispute resolution, traditional ADR, and court proceedings. An example of a delegated 
regulatory adjudication, that is, the adjudicating of local loop unbundling (LLU) in the UK, will be 
examined in Section 2.1 of this paper.  
Clearly, each dispute resolution scheme adopted in implementation of the EU Telecom 
Package allows for various levels of involvement of the official, regulatory sector.
38
 The varied 
official intervention in dispute resolution is illustrated in the table below prepared and presented by 
Rory Macmillan at the ITU/BDT European Workshop on Dispute Resolution held between August 31 
and September 2, 2004.
39
  
Figure 2: Involvement of the official and non-official sectors
40
 
Each dispute resolution technique has a different level of involvement of the official sector   
  
Regulatory 
adjudication 
Arbitration 
Non-binding 
determination 
Mediation/conciliation   
Controlling 
the process 
Official 
Parties and 
arbitrator 
Parties and 
expert 
Parties and mediator   
Choice of 3rd 
party 
Official Parties Parties Parties of official   
Identity of 
3rd party 
Official Non-official Non-official Non-official or official   
Deciding 
result 
Official Arbitrator Expert Parties   
Review of 
process/result 
Official Official Unusual Probably none   
Enforcement Official Official Parties Parties   
Against this background, the purpose of the second part of this paper is two-fold. First, I aim at 
identifying the disputes between telecommunications undertakings over both regulatory obligations 
and commercial settings stemming from the regulatory dynamics in the telecommunications sector. I 
adopt a relatively broad definition of the notion “dispute”, incorporating the preliminary stages of 
dispute resolution schemes even prior to the submission of a formal claim or complaint by the parties. 
This approach, however, does not accommodate investigations conducted by NRAs, nor the 
                                                     
36 Rory Macmillan, “Effective Dispute Resolution: A Pressing Priority for Policy-Makers and Regulators,” p. 29.  
37 This term has been developed jointly by the author and Marta Cantero-Gamito, a Ph.D. Candidate at the European 
University Institute. 
38 Rory Macmillan, “Effective Dispute Resolution: A Pressing Priority for Policy-Makers and Regulators,” p. 28. 
39 Source: Rory Macmillan, Lawyer and Mediator. Extracted from Mr Macmillan’s presentation at the ITU/BDT European 
Workshop on Dispute Resolution, 31 August to 2 September 2004. Macmillan’s paper is available at: 
http://www.itu.int/itunews/manager/display.asp?lang=en&year=2004&issue=10&ipage=dispute&ext=html.  
40 Ibid. 
ADR in B2B Disputes in the EU Telecommunications Sector 
 
 11 
conflicting interests of the telecommunications operators in the meaning of a dispute as adopted in the 
ITU Discussion Paper.  Here, I also look at judicial review of the NRAs’ adjudicative solutions, 
especially as far as the NRA’s decisions to outsource certain disputes to alternative adjudicatory 
bodies and other discretionary powers of NRAs as identified in this section are concerned.  The second 
objective is to analyse the procedures for the resolution of different telecommunications disputes, 
specifically in view of the suitability of certain alternative means for the industry-specific disputes, on 
one side, and for the commercial disputes that involve lesser regulatory intervention and rather stem 
from contractual settings of the parties engaged, on the other side. The major question to be addressed 
is whether industry-specific ADR as adopted in various national jurisdictions follows coherent 
patterns, and if not (as can be preliminary derived from the introductory part of the paper), what is the 
rationale of NRAs to favour one alternative mechanism over another with regard to different national 
regulatory models as well as diverse business cultures within the studied jurisdictions.
41
           
2.1. National Perspectives 
The UK 
 
In the UK, the regulation of the communications sector has been assigned to the Office of 
Communications commonly known as Ofcom.
42
 Ofcom is an example of a converged regulator that 
deals with a number of specific issues emerging in different regulatory areas (such as networks and 
services, spectrum management, and broadcasting), in a horizontal manner.
43
 Ofcom defines its 
functions of convergence as follows: 
 
In a converged age many of the issues facing the communications issue transcend the old 
boundaries and therefore need a converged response.  This is certainly true in competition law and 
economics, where Ofcom is a competition authority alongside the United Kingdom’s OFT [Office 
of Fair Trading]. Linked to that is an ability to deal with incumbency on a scale that - albeit 
smaller - is more evenly matched to the regulatory affairs departments of the main incumbents, in 
knowledge, experience and in talent and motivation.
44
  
 
Ofcom assumes various functions, one of them involving dispute resolution.
45
 Section 185 of the UK 
Communications Act of 2003 (the UK Communications Act) enumerates the types of disputes that fall 
within Ofcom’s authority, such as disputes over both the provision of network access and regulatory 
obligations imposed on the parties.
46
 The prospective content of such disputes is very broadly defined, 
and it encompasses disputes related to terms and conditions under which the network access is 
provided and the terms and conditions on which any transaction is entered into for the purpose of 
complying with a regulatory obligation.
47
  
                                                     
41 See “Dispute Resolution among ICT providers” in: “Functional Aspects of Regulation”, ITU downloadable paper at 
www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/sectionexport/word/6.6.   
42 The website of Ofcom can be accessed via: http://www.ofcom.org.uk  
43 For a comprehensive explanation of the dynamics of convergence in telecommunications markets see Rand’s Technical 
Report on: Responding to Convergence: Different approaches for Telecommunication regulators, prepared by Constantijn 
van Oranje-Nassau, Jonathan Cave, Martin van der Mandele, Rebecca Schindler, Seo Yeon Hong, Ilian Iliev, Ingo 
Vogelsang for Dutch Independent Telecommunications and Post Regulator (OPTA), 2008, available at: 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2011/RAND_TR700.pdf.  
44 See: ICT Regulatory Toolkit, Practice Note 2030 on the “Case Study Converged Regulator: Ofcom [6.1.1]” available at: 
http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/toolkit/notes/PracticeNote/2030.  
45 For more information on the functions of Ofcom, see: Ibid.  
46 The UK Communications Act of 2003, 2003 c. 21, available at: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2003/21/contents.   
47 Ibid. 
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 Some types of disputes have been expressly excluded from the scope of Section 185 of the UK 
Communications Act pursuant to paragraph 7 of Section 185. These disputes involve the following: 
 
 Obligations imposed on communications providers under SMP conditions; 
 Contraventions of Sections 125 to 127 of the UK Communications Act; 
 Obligations imposed on communications providers by or pursuant to sections 128 and 131; 
 The operation in the case of communications providers of section 134. 
 
Sections 186 and 188 of the UK Communications Act, dealing with the actions of Ofcom related to 
“dispute reference” and the procedure for resolving disputes, accordingly mirror the European dispute 
resolution framework as established under the EU Telecom Package. Hence, pursuant to ordinary 
procedure, Ofcom should first determine whether it is appropriate or not to handle a dispute. In 
making such a determination, Ofcom should take into account the availability of alternative means and 
their impact on a prompt resolution of a particular dispute. In cases in which a dispute referred to ADR 
is not resolved within four months, Ofcom has the authority to accept the dispute should either of the 
parties involved refer it back to Ofcom. The UK Communications Act confers broad powers on Ofcom 
when it comes to setting forth the submission procedure to be followed by the parties, as well as the 
procedure for Ofcom related to the consideration and determination of a dispute. Ofcom should 
resolve the dispute within four months from the moment of issuing a determination that it constitutes 
the appropriate forum in terms of handling the  dispute or from the day on which the parties involved 
in the dispute referred it back to Ofcom. 
 
 Although the respective provisions of the UK Communications Act seem to entirely mimic the 
dispute resolution procedure contained in the EU Telecom Package, Paul Brisby points to the 
existence of a loophole in Section 186 of the Act that concerns no reference to a time-limit within 
which Ofcom should decide on its appropriateness to hear a dispute or refer it to ADR.
48
 According to 
Brisby, this was the subject of a stormy debate between the members of the industry and the UK 
Department of Trade and Industry at the moment when the draft UK Communications Act was being 
debated.
49
   
 
 Ofcom’s regulatory powers in resolving disputes have been acknowledged in Section 190 of 
the UK Communications Act. In principle, Ofcom can use one or more of the following prerogatives: 
 
 Declare the rights and obligations of the parties to a dispute; 
 Issue a direction fixing the terms and conditions of transactions between the parties involved 
in a dispute; 
 Issue a direction imposing an obligation to enter into a transaction between the parties on 
terms and conditions fixed by Ofcom. In this case, both parties should be responsible for the 
enforcement of such a direction; 
 Issue a direction for the purpose of giving effect to a determination by Ofcom of the proper 
amount of a charge with regard to which amounts have been paid by one of the parties 
involved in a dispute to the other, requiring the payment of sums by way of adjustment of an 
underpayment or overpayment. In this case, the party to whom the sums are to be paid should 
be responsible for the enforcement of the direction.
50
 
 
Section 190 (5) of the UK Communications Act provides for the particular powers of Ofcom in cases 
where a dispute is referred back to Ofcom after being considered by an ADR body. Ofcom may not 
                                                     
48 Paul Brisby, “Dispute Resolution in Telecoms – The Regulatory Perspective,” p. 6. 
49 Ibid. 
50 These powers do not refer to the resolution of disputes relating to rights and obligations conferred or imposed by way of 
enactments relating to the management of radio spectrums. See: Section 190 (2) of the UK Communications Act. 
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only take into account the decisions already made through ADR, but it may also include in its 
determinations the provisions ratifying the solutions that had been previously informally reached. As 
reads from Ofcom’s Dispute Resolution Guidelines published on December 17, 2010 (Ofcom’s 
Guidelines of 2010), Ofcom will recognise the “without prejudice” nature of negotiations conducted in 
the alternative resolution of disputes in order not to disadvantage any party to the dispute.
51
 Moreover, 
Ofcom will assess the outcomes of previous ADR mechanisms in view of the regulatory principles and 
statutory duties as set forth in the UK Communications Act. This is a fascinating example of the 
reliance by NRAs on ADR, as it involves a specific interplay between regulatory intervention and 
private, informal solutions, in particular as far as the complementary powers of NRAs and private 
adjudicators acting within ADR schemes are concerned.  
 
 The UK Telecommunications Act, in Sections 193-196 also deals with the appeal procedures 
against the decision of Ofcom. The appeals should be decided by the Competition Appeal Tribunal 
(CAT). Additionally, the price control matters arising in the appeals must be referred to the 
Competition Commission (CC) for determination. Yet again the UK Communications Act does not 
specify if there is a possibility for the parties to appeal against the decisions taken by means of ADR. 
This may suggest that the admissibility of the appeals within the ADR mechanisms should follow the 
dynamics and objectives of each particular alternative means of dispute resolution, as adopted for the 
specific case.  
 
 Dispute resolution procedures as applied or determined by Ofcom concern the following 
mechanisms: (1) regulatory adjudication; (2) delegated regulatory adjudication; and (3) ADR. Let us 
now examine the application of these mechanisms to particular types of inter-operator disputes that 
emerge in the UK telecommunications market.      
Regulatory adjudication 
 
Ofcom’s policy in hearing regulatory disputes is claimed to be conservative and the regulatory 
adjudication will likely involve cases between multiple parties or disputes in which at least one party 
involved is of a dominant position.
52
 Therefore, the main factors for determining Ofcom’s jurisdiction 
to handle a dispute concern the number of market players involved, the complexity of the case, and the 
position of the party involved in a dispute within the telecommunications market rather than a subject 
matter of a dispute that requires regulatory adjudication. 
 
 The procedure to be applied by Ofcom when handling regulatory disputes is discussed in the 
Ofcom’s Guidelines of 2010 as revised by Ofcom’s Dispute Resolution Guidelines: Ofcom’s 
Guidelines for the Handling of Regulatory Disputes of June 7, 2011 (Ofcom’s Guidelines of 2011).53 
The following analysis of Ofcom’s regulatory adjudication does not aim at addressing all the steps of 
Ofcom’s dispute resolution process in detail. Rather, it is directed towards a better understanding of 
the discretion of Ofcom in making regulatory decisions as enshrined in the UK Communications Act, 
                                                     
51 See Ofcom’s Dispute Resolution Guidelines: Ofcom’s Guidelines for the Handling of Regulatory Disputes, published on 
December 17, 2010, available at: http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/dispute-resolution-
guidelines/summary/condoc.pdf, Section 6.17.  
52 Paul Brisby, “Dispute Resolution in Telecoms – The Regulatory Perspective,” p. 9. See also: Ibid. 
53 Sections 185-191 of the UK Communications Act 2003 were amended by the Electronic Communications and Wireless 
Telegraphy Regulations 2011 (SI 2011/1210) that increased Ofcom’s powers in resolving regulatory disputes. As a result 
Ofcom published a revised version of its Guidelines, Ofcom’s Dispute Resolution Guidelines: Ofcom’s Guidelines for 
the Handling of Regulatory Disputes of June 7, 2011. The revised document is available at: 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/dispute-resolution-guidelines/statement/guidelines.pdf.  See also: 
Payment of costs and expenses in regulatory disputes: Guidance on Ofcom’s approach published on September 4, 2013, 
available at: http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/payment-costs/statement/guidance.pdf.    
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as well as of the practical insights of Ofcom’s determinations especially in view of the ambiguities 
relating to the dispute resolution framework under the EU Telecom Package.   
 
Ofcom’s assessment of every dispute submission entails two procedural steps: (1) the enquiry 
phase, and (2) formal proceedings. Both phases of Ofcom’s dispute resolution should be conducted 
within four months from the date of referral of the dispute by the parties. Figure 3 below, taken from 
Ofcom’s Dispute Resolution Guidelines, illustrates the key steps to be taken by Ofcom in order to 
issue a final determination in a timely manner.  
 
Figure 3: Statutory Timeline of Ofcom’s Dispute Resolution Process54 
 
   
 
First, within the enquiry phase, Ofcom will make relevant determinations on the existence of 
statutory grounds for it to handle the dispute. A case management team comprising members of 
Ofcom’s Investigation team, lawyers and other specialists such as economists or financial experts, 
preliminary scrutinises each dispute.
55
 Each team consists of a case leader acting as a point of 
reference for the parties involved. Section 7 of Ofcom’s Guidelines of 2010 (as reintroduced in 
Section 6 of Ofcom’s Guidelines of 2011) sets forth the submission requirements that should be 
carefully addressed by the parties, as they will constitute a factual and substantive basis for Ofcom to 
make relevant determinations of its jurisdiction. The submission should be made to the Investigations 
Programme Manager of Ofcom’s Competition Group, and it should contain the following particulars: 
preliminary information regarding the parties and a summary of the dispute;
56
 the issue the dispute 
                                                     
54 Source: the Ofcom’s Guidelines of 2010. 
55 Ofcom’s Guidelines of 2010, Section 3.16.  
56 Ibid., Section 7.8. 
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concerns including both a comprehensive explanation of the scope of the dispute and information 
regarding any justification given for the conduct or action that resulted in the dispute;
57
 the history and 
evidence of any commercial negotiations conducted between the parties, as well as evidence 
suggesting that all reasonable steps have been taken to engage the opposing party in commercial 
negotiations in cases in which such a party refused to participate in the preliminary amicable dispute 
resolution;
58
 reference to Ofcom’s relevant statutory and Community duties as applicable in a 
particular case together with the explanation of the significance of the dispute for broader regulatory 
issues or policies;
59
 and finally the proposed remedy in view of the technicalities of the dispute and 
Ofcom’s remedial powers within the meaning of both Section 190 of the UK Communications Act and 
Ofcom’s statutory duties.60   
 
Based on the information provided in the dispute submission by the parties, Ofcom will admit 
its jurisdiction if it finds that all statutory requirements are met. This will involve a determination that 
a dispute in fact exists between the parties, that the parties named in the submission are proper parties 
to the dispute, and that other alternative mechanisms are not better suited for the resolution of the 
dispute. The Ofcom’s Guidelines of 2011 confirm Ofcom’s authority to hear disputes related to the 
provision of, and the entitlements to, network access that communications providers are required to 
provide under Section 45 of the UK Communications Act, and all other disputes that are not excluded 
by specific provisions of the Act concerning the rights and obligations under Section 45 of the Act or 
any of the enactments relating to the management of the radio spectrum.
61
 Ofcom will make 
determinations whether the dispute referred by the parties falls within any of these categories on a 
case-by-case basis. For this reason, Ofcom will also examine the nature of a dispute within the enquiry 
phase.
62
  
          
Regarding the assessment of the proper parties to a dispute, Ofcom will analyse if a dispute 
is between different communications providers, between a communications provider and a person who 
makes associated facilities available, or between different persons making such facilities available.
63
 
Additionally, if a dispute is referred to Ofcom under section 185(1A) of the UK Communications Act, 
Ofcom will examine if the dispute is one between a communications provider and a person who is 
identified or is a member of a class identified, in a condition imposed on the communications provider 
under section 45 of the UK Communications Act; or whether the dispute concerns entitlements to 
network access that the communications provider is required to provide to that person by or under that 
condition.
64
  
 
Given that a detailed analysis of the ADR mechanisms to be applied in the UK 
telecommunications disputes will be provided in the following part of this paper, it is necessary now to 
only examine the objectives of Ofcom while assessing its inappropriateness to hear a dispute in view 
of the suitability of certain alternative means of dispute resolution. Ofcom will decline to hear a 
dispute if it determines that alternative means are available and suitable for a prompt and satisfactory 
resolution of a dispute, in accordance with Ofcom’s statutory duties and the Community requirements 
set out in Section 4 of the UK Communications Act.
65
 Moreover, such determinations will be made on 
                                                     
57 Ibid., Sections 7.9 and 7.10. 
58 Ibid., Section 7.11.  
59 Ibid., Section 7.13. 
60 Ofcom’s Guidelines of 2010, Sections 7.14 and 7.15.  
61 Ofcom’s Guidelines of 2011, Section 2.5. 
62 Ofcom’s Guidelines of 2010, Section 4.3. 
63 Ofcom’s Guidelines of 2011, Sections 3.8.1-3.8.3. 
64 Ibid., Sections 3.9. 
65 Ibid., Sections 4.10.2 and 4.11.  
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a case-by-case basis in view of different motives and incentives of the parties involved to reach 
commercial negotiations, as well as taking into account possible discrepancies in the negotiation 
power of the parties.
66
  
 
Section 4.17 of Ofcom’s Guidelines of 2011 contains a noteworthy statement related to 
Ofcom’s policy on admitting or rejecting referred disputes, which also poses interesting implications 
for the assessment of the potential suitability of ADR mechanisms for the resolution of disputes. 
Ofcom declares that, with regard to network access disputes referred to Ofcom under Section 185(1) 
of the UK Communications Act, when deciding its appropriateness in terms of handling a given 
dispute, Ofcom may also take into consideration its priorities and available resources existent at the 
time a dispute is submitted to one of its teams. This means that Ofcom is under no statutory 
requirement to hear network access disputes. In making determinations regarding Ofcom’s priorities 
and available resources, Ofcom will take into account its administrative priority criteria and other 
factors to the exclusion of Ofcom’s view on the merits of a dispute.67 Should one of these factors come 
into play, it is likely that a dispute will not be referred to ADR, as it will either be heard by Ofcom 
itself or be subject to alternative regulatory actions (such as planned market reviews).
68
 The lack of 
statutory obligation of Ofcom to hear network access disputes is a function of the changes 
incorporated in the UK Communications Act.
69
  However, a question emerges here concerning 
whether Ofcom’s policy-driven attitude towards assessing its jurisdiction in fact stays in line with the 
requirements contained in the EU Telecom Package, which—in principle—put Ofcom in a position to 
hear regulatory disputes.
70
 Some commentators assert that Ofcom’s approach to hearing and declining 
disputes should not be a subject of criticism, as it may enhance the effectiveness of Ofcom’s broad 
regulatory functions.
71
  
 
The last stage of the enquiry phase conducted by Ofcom involves the exchange of the non-
confidential versions of the submission, the organization of the Enquiry Phase Meeting (EPM) by 
Ofcom, and the notifications made to the parties by Ofcom regarding its acceptance or rejection of a 
dispute.
72
 The EPM requires particular attention here as it attests to Ofcom’s policy on promoting the 
input of the parties in the effective determination of the scope of disputes and their possible prompt 
resolution. The EPM takes the form of an informal meeting attended by the parties’ commercial and 
regulatory affairs representatives.
73
 During the EPM, Ofcom confirms the facts of a dispute, its scope 
                                                     
66 Ibid., Sections 4.11 and 4.13. 
67 See Section 4.19 of the Ofcom’s Guidelines of 2011 where the factors to be taken into account by Ofcom are enlisted. 
These factors involve the following: 
 The risk to the interests of citizens or consumers as a result of the dispute (and whether that risk is immediate or not 
and whether it is direct or indirect);  
 The resources required to resolve a dispute, given the need to do justice to the interests of all parties likely to be 
affected by the dispute (for example: citizens and consumers; the Parties in dispute; and third parties). Particular 
issues may arise where there are specific policy or specialist skills that are required to undertake a dispute;  
 Whether the issue that has been identified relates directly to Ofcom’s broader strategic goals or priorities (including 
those within Ofcom’s Annual Plan);  
 Whether the matters in dispute are on-going; and  
 Whether there are other alternative regulatory actions (for example, planned market reviews) that are likely to 
achieve the same ends, or deal with the same issues, as the dispute. This could include, for example, whether other 
agencies may be better placed to consider the subject matter of the dispute. 
68 Ibid. 
69 These changes resulted from the implementation of the revised EU Telecom Package into the UK telecommunications law.  
70 Paul Brisby, “Dispute Resolution in Telecoms – The Regulatory Perspective.” 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ofcom’s Guidleines of 2010, Sections 5.17 – 5.25. 
73 Ibid., Section 5.19.  
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and the timetable for the resolution of the dispute provided that Ofcom has previously established its 
position in terms of admitting the dispute.  
 
Although Ofcom claims not to be a mediator or arbitrator serving either of the parties involved 
in a dispute, the above-mentioned steps to be taken by Ofcom in terms of its jurisdiction, as well as the 
requirements for submission referrals as established by Ofcom within its discretionary powers, 
resemble the procedure that the most prominent arbitration institutions follow.
74
 The parallels can be 
found in the following: Ofcom’s conservative approach to formal submissions, the requirements that 
both parties carefully explain their positions and the nature of the dispute, the role of Ofcom’s case-
managers in communicating with the parties and their role in terms of the preliminary assessment of 
the dispute, and finally the information gathering prerogatives of Ofcom contained under Section 191 
of the UK Telecommunications Act. Specifically, the existence of the EMP could be compared with a 
document called “Terms of Reference” that is issued at the outset of the International Court of 
Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) arbitration proceedings aimed at 
ensuring that arbitrators will not exceed their jurisdiction and confirming the procedural aspects of the 
pending arbitration case. Some arbitral institutions such as the American Arbitration Association 
(AAA) with its International Centre for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) also provide for preliminary 
conferences or meetings with the parties in order to speed up the preliminary assessment of a dispute. 
This is not to claim that Ofcom’s preliminary determinations of jurisdiction derive from arbitration 
traditions. Rather, it is relevant to point here to the crucial role of the parties themselves in the initial 
phase of their dispute resolution processes before Ofcom in terms of assessing the admissibility of the 
dispute and its further determination, similarly to the preliminary stages of traditional arbitration 
proceedings.  
 
The second phase of Ofcom’s dispute resolution process concerns the formal proceedings. The 
proceedings before Ofcom begin with the publication by Ofcom of its decision regarding the 
admissibility of a dispute in Ofcom’s Competition and Consumer Enforcement Bulletin. In line with 
Section 190(2A) of the UK Communications Act, Ofcom should issue a decision with a view on the 
necessary promotion of efficiency, sustainable competition, efficient investment and innovation, and 
finally for the greatest possible benefit for the end-users of public electronic communications 
services.
75
 The relevant parties to such disputes should state in their submissions how their disputes 
comply with these objectives.  
 
Ofcom is under no statutory obligation to consult the parties on draft dispute determinations.
76
 
This is, however, not part of Ofcom’s policy. In fact, Ofcom allows stakeholders to reflect on draft 
dispute resolution provisions. This “consultation process” has been recently facilitated by Ofcom in 
order to enhance the probability of prompt resolution of disputes, in any case within four months from 
the day the dispute is referred by the parties.
77
 In approximately the eighth week of the dispute 
resolution process, Ofcom will publish on its website a document entitled “Dispute Consultation” in 
which it will set out the major arguments related to the resolution of a particular dispute. The 
stakeholders will then have between ten to fifteen days to submit their comments on the Dispute 
Consultation.
78
 Final determinations of disputes are binding upon the parties and enforceable by a 
relevant court.
79
  
 
                                                     
74 Ibid., Section 3.2. 
75 Ofcom’s Guidelines of 2011, Section 5.28. 
76 See: Article 6 of the Framework Directive. 
77 Ofcom’s Guidelines of 2011, Sections 5.33 up to 5.40. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., Section 5.41.  
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The last of Ofcom’s prerogatives that requires analysis here concerns Ofcom’s discretion in 
recovering the costs of its regulatory adjudication from the parties under the new provisions 
contained in the UK Communications Act. Ofcom’s powers in this regard have been amended by the 
Electronic Communications and Wireless Telegraphy Regulations 2011 (SI 2011/1210) (the 
Regulations). Under Section 190 of the UK Communications Act as amended by the Regulations, 
Ofcom may require a party to cover the costs of the dispute resolution procedure after assessing both: 
the party’s conduct prior to and following the submission referral to Ofcom concerning the party’s 
attempts to resolve a dispute and whether Ofcom has made a decision in favour of a particular party.
80
 
Additionally, Ofcom has a right to recover the costs and expenses incurred in handling disputes under 
spectrum legislation or any other types of disputes provided that Ofcom had previously considered the 
factors set out in Section 190 of the UK Communications Act, as explained above.  
 
This is an important reform regarding Ofcom’s powers in recovering the costs and expenses 
related to its dispute resolution scheme. Prior to the amendments, Ofcom was authorized to claim the 
costs and fees from the parties only through the convoluted administrative charges provided for across 
the telecommunications industry pursuant to Section 38 of the UK Communications Act.
81
 What is 
more, this reform was aided by the possible encouragement of the parties to rely on alternative means 
of dispute resolution, at least with regard to disputes that are suitable for ADR. The Department for 
Culture, Media, and Sport, responsible for implementing the changes related to the EU Telecom 
Package, in its Statement of 15 April 2011 that underpinned the Regulations expressly specified that 
the new provisions on costs recovery are likely to be invoked by Ofcom in cases where the parties 
have not engaged in ADR prior to the submission of a dispute to Ofcom (should ADR mechanisms be 
available to such parties).
82
 The official policy standing behind these changes relates to the public 
confidence in ADR schemes in the telecommunications sector, which were said to be “cost effective 
and less bureaucratic than the current [Ofcom’s] dispute resolution process.”83  This public trust in 
private dispute resolution mechanisms is enrooted in the history of the ADR movement in the UK that 
concerns the existence of a strong private – public partnership supporting the application of ADR 
within different public sectors in the UK.
84
  
 
Moreover, the linkages between costs of regulatory adjudication and the parties’ exhaustion of 
different ADR methods prior to the referral of a dispute to Ofcom, as expressed in the UK 
Communications Act, reflect general support for the role of ADR in civil litigation in the UK. A few 
UK judgments confirmed that in the case of a litigant’s failure to participate in ADR, the court would 
be in a position to impose costs sanctions upon it.
85
 Already in the decision in Halsey v Milton Keynes 
General NHS Trust [2004] 1 WLR 3002, the Court of Appeal set forth the so-called “Halsey 
principles” expressing judicial support for ADR in the UK. First, the Court of Appeal stated that it 
might encourage the parties to engage in ADR in suitable cases. Second, it was confirmed that when 
exercising its discretion relating to the allocation of costs between the parties, the Court of Appeal was 
                                                     
80 Section 190 of the UK Communications Act. 
81 See Department for Business Innovation & Skills Statement: “Implementing the revised EU Electronic Communications 
Framework: Overall Approach and Consultations on Specific Issues,” September 2010, available at: 
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authorized to consider the parties’ conduct regarding their participation in ADR. As such, the Court of 
Appeals could deprive the successful party of some or all its costs when such a party had unreasonably 
refused to participate in ADR. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals defined the situations in which the 
parties’ refusal to engage in ADR could have implications for the Court’s determination that such 
refusal was unreasonable. These situations concerned the following:  
 
a. The nature of the dispute; 
b. The merits of the case; 
c. The extent to which other settlement methods have been attempted; 
d. Whether the costs of the ADR would be disproportionately high; 
e. Whether any delay in setting up and attending the ADR would have been prejudicial; 
f. Whether the ADR had any reasonable prospect of success.86 
 
The second judgement to be analysed here concerns the decision of the Court of Appeal in PGF II SA 
v OMFS Company Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1288.
87
 This remarkable judgement extended the Halsey 
principles in support of ADR by way of holding that even a defendant’s silence vis-à-vis the invitation 
for mediation could be qualified as a ground for determining that the defendant’s refusal to mediate 
was unreasonable. This, in turn, justified the costs sanctions imposed on a “recalcitrant” litigant. The 
Court of Appeal (Justice Briggs) stated that: 
 
In my judgment, the time has now come for this court firmly to endorse the advice given in 
Chapter 11.56 of the ADR Handbook, that silence in the face of an invitation to participate in 
ADR is, as a general rule, of itself unreasonable, regardless whether an outright refusal, or a 
refusal to engage in the type of ADR requested, or to do so at the time requested, might have been 
justified by the identification of reasonable grounds. I put this forward as a general rather than 
invariable rule because it is possible that there may be rare cases where ADR is so obviously 
inappropriate that to characterise silence as unreasonable would be pure formalism. There may 
also be cases where the failure to respond at all was a result of some mistake in the office, leading 
to a failure to appreciate that the invitation had been made, but in such cases the onus would lie 
squarely on the recipient of the invitation to make that explanation good.
88
  
 
Having identified the general UK courts’ support for ADR, it should be clear that the recent changes to 
Ofcom’s powers in recovering the costs of its adjudication vis-à-vis the parties who failed to engage in 
ADR, as conferred on Ofcom in the UK Communications Act, are in line with the general approach to 
encourage ADR prior to the initiation of the official proceedings (be it judicial or regulatory) by the 
parties in the UK. Surprisingly, Ofcom’s commentary to the new provisions suggests a more moderate 
approach to the use of ADR prior to the submission of a dispute to regulatory adjudication. In its 
revised Dispute Resolution Guidelines, Ofcom states that: “costs requirements should not act to 
discourage Parties from referring genuine regulatory disputes for resolution where alternative dispute 
resolution may not be appropriate.”89  
 
The above statement implies that Ofcom will assess the suitability of ADR for regulatory 
disputes on a base-by-case basis, though using a narrower approach to ADR as compared to the broad 
and supporting attitude that was expressed by the English courts in the above-mentioned judgments. 
Moreover, it seems that Ofcom will likely tend to confirm its broad powers in regulatory adjudication, 
and decline a dispute only if the outcome of such a dispute has no significance for the regulatory 
dynamics in the UK telecommunications sector. 
                                                     
86 Halsey v Milton Keynes General NHS Trust [2004] 1 WLR 3002, available at: 
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/1288.html, Sections 17-23  
87 PGF II SA v OMFS Company Ltd [2013] EWCA Civ 1288, available at: 
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88 Ibid., Section 34.  
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Delegated regulatory adjudication 
  
There are also certain types of disputes between communications undertakings that have been 
outsourced or delegated by Ofcom to various independent adjudicator schemes to promote the delivery 
of high quality industrialised products within different communications sectors. There exist three 
Adjudicator Schemes in the context of Ofcom’s delegated regulatory adjudication that should be 
analysed below: (1) the Telecommunications Adjudicator with regard to disputes concerning LLU, (2) 
the Adjudicator for Broadcast Transmission Services, and (3) the Adjudicator established for the 
resolution of disputes between Carlton-Granada and its advertising customers with regard to the 
Contract Rights Renewal (CRR) Remedy. 
 
 The Office of Telecommunications Adjudicator (OTA) was established by Ofcom in June 
2004 to “work with the industry to help develop new local loop unbundling (‘LLU’) products and 
processes which were fit-for-purpose and industrialised to cope with large volumes over time.”90 
OTA’s original adjudication scheme is now employed by OTA2 that operates through the activity of 
several telecommunications professionals with extensive experience in different communications 
industries.
91
 OTA2 is an organization independent from Ofcom and the industry. As specified on 
OTA2’s website, its main goal is to: “deal with major or strategic issues affecting the rollout and 
performance of products provided by Openreach, the company which manages the UK’s local 
telephone network and connects customers to their local telephone exchange.”92 
  
 Although OTA2 is an independent body, the framework underpinning OTA2’s operation was 
designed entirely by Ofcom. The following documents constitute the Telecommunications 
Adjudication Framework: (1) Telecommunications Adjudication Scheme; (2) Scheme Agreement; (3) 
Adjudicator Appointment Rules; (4) Facilitation Rules; (5) Dispute Resolution Rules; (6) and Ofcom’s 
Terms of Reference for the Telecommunications Adjudication Scheme for LLU.
93
 The latest version 
of the guidelines accessible to the public used by OTA2 in their adjudication of a dispute date back to 
October 14, 2004.
94
 
 
 OTA2 will hear a dispute between British Telecommunications plc (BT) and other providers 
of electronic communications networks and services (operators) under various bilateral contracts (such 
as Access Network Facilities Agreements) entered into by the parties. In sum, the disputes to be 
referred to OTA2 concern disagreements between operators and BT related to the granting by BT of 
access to the telephone exchange, which in principle should be provided on a non-discriminatory 
basis. Section 2 of the original OTA Guidelines of 2004 states that the Telecommunications 
Adjudication Rules—once incorporated into the parties’ Access Network Facilities Agreements under 
the so-called “Scheme Agreements”—should displace any contractual provisions contained therein. 
The OTA Adjudication Scheme is regarded as a voluntary, private contractual mechanism agreed on 
between the parties for the resolution of their disputes.
95
 The objectives of the Adjudicator under the 
OTA Scheme were defined in Ofcom’s Terms of Reference and concern the following:  
                                                     
90 See Ofcom’s Review of Telecommunications Adjudication Scheme for LLU available at 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/telecoms/groups/telecoms-adjudication-scheme/review/.  
91 It is unclear to the author (who were unsuccessful in receving the answer from OTA2 itself) whether the existent OTA2 
scheme departs from the original OTA scheme in a significant manner. In this view, the OTA original scheme is 
presented here as an explanation of the dynamics of the original delegated regulatory adjudication that was performed by 
OTA. See also: the names and bio notes of the OTA2 team at: http://www.offta.org.uk/about.htm.  
92 See OTA2 website at: http://www.offta.org.uk.  
93 The documents falling within the Telecommunications Adjudication Scheme are available at:  
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/telecoms/groups/telecoms-adjudication-scheme/?a=0  
94 The 2004 OTA Guidelines are avilable at: http://www.offta.org.uk/ag141020041.pdf  
95 Section 6 of the 2004 OTA Guidelines. 
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 Reasonable resource constraints (including training requirements) of Operators and BT and 
the ability of Operators and BT to increase resources, although the Adjudicator is able to 
recommend (in facilitation) or require (in Rulings and Adjudications) reasonable increases in 
resources;  
 Efficiently incurred and reasonable costs, and the need to avoid wasteful expenditure by 
Operators and BT;  
 Likely future demand levels and forecasts;  
 Reasonable cost recovery and reasonable profit;  
 The policy context as set by Ofcom/Oftel and regulatory rules (including any relevant 
Ofcom/Oftel guidelines) in relation to LLU and other relevant products and such policy / 
regulatory rules as are amended from time to time;  
 Existing product / processes;  
 Existing customers;  
 Network security and network integrity;  
 The activities and recommendations of other related groups such as the NICC and Billing 
Industry Forum;  
 Where relevant, Ofcom’s statutory duties; and 
 The impact of any decision on other LLUOs, Operators and BT as well as on the Parties to the 
Dispute.
96
  
The original OTA Adjudication Process resembles the regulatory adjudication scheme conducted by 
Ofcom. Although there is no formal distinction between the enquiry phase and formal proceedings, the 
Adjudicator will expect the parties to first follow the formal requirements for their submission, 
including obtaining clarification from the parties on whether they have previously engaged in any 
ADR techniques (e.g. commercial negotiations) towards resolving the dispute.
97
 At any time, the 
Adjudicator may refer a dispute to facilitation (or further facilitation) should it decide that such 
techniques would contribute to faster and more effective dispute resolution.
98
 Second, the Adjudicator 
will take into account if a referred dispute falls within the category of adjudicable disputes within the 
meaning of Sections 3.2 and 3.3 of the Dispute Resolution Rules.
99
 There are two ways for submitting 
disputes to the Adjudicator: (1) the disputes may be referred by a party before such disputes are 
submitted to Ofcom, or (2) the disputes may be referred by Ofcom after such disputes have been first 
submitted to it for a resolution. In the first case, the Adjudicator will be expected to issue a Ruling; 
while in the second scenario, the Adjudicator will be requested to produce an Adjudication.
100
  
 In fact, the Adjudicator may not act as arbitrator or mediator vis-à-vis the parties, and its 
functions are limited to resolving a dispute as a facilitator or an independent expert.
101
 The Adjudicator 
should in any case issue an independent, objective and fair determination of the dispute with regard to 
the principles of natural justice.
102
 As the general commentary to the operation of OTA2 will be 
provided at the end of this section, we should proceed here to concentrate on an examination of the 
activity of another “delegated” adjudicator in the UK, namely, the Adjudicator for Broadcast 
Transmission Services (OTA-BTS).  
 OTA-BTS was established in 2008 following the decision, dated March 11, 2008 of the CC, in 
which the CC permitted the merger of transmission companies Arqiva and National Grid Wireless 
                                                     
96 See The 2004 OTA Guidelines and the references to Ofcom’s Terms of Reference in Section 4.5 of the Guidelines. 
97 See Annex 2 to the 2004 OTA Guidelines entitled: “Format for Referring Dispute to the Adjudicator”.  
98 Section 15 of the 2004 OTA Guidelines. 
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(NGW) based on their agreement to a package of measures (undertakings) aimed at guarding the 
interests of their customers.
103
 The CC was at the time concerned that such a merger would contribute 
to a lessening of competition in broadcast transmission services and it therefore encouraged the 
establishment of OTA-BTS to oversee the changes to, and the developments of, the broadcast 
transmission market.
104
 The Adjudication Scheme of OTA-BTS is contained in Annex 2 of a 
document entitled “Undertakings to the Competition Commission by Macquarie UK Broadcast 
Holdings Limited, Macquarie MCG International Limited, Macquarie European Infrastructure Fund II, 
Macquarie European Infrastructure Fund III and Macquarie Capital Funds (Europe) Limited“ 
(Undertakings) and is based on the guidelines prepared by Ofcom on October 21, 2008.
105
 Moreover, 
as reads from Ofcom’s News Release of September 12, 2008, Ofcom was charged with the 
appointment of Mr. Alan Watson as the first Adjudicator under the OTA-BTS Adjudication 
Scheme.
106
  
 The Adjudication Scheme of OTA-BTS is relevant for the resolution of disputes arising out of 
or in connection with all television and radio transmission agreements concluded by Arqiva and its 
customers.
107
 The adjudicable dispute arises when the commercial negotiations between the parties 
have failed.
108
 The formal process before the Adjudicator is initiated upon the submission of a Notice 
of Adjudication that should meet all requirements established in Section 6 of Appendix 2 to the 
Undertakings. Within seven working days from the receipt of the Notice of Adjudication, the 
Adjudicator will publish a document including the scope of the dispute, which should then be 
addressed by the opposing party by way of submitting a response to such a Notice (called the Notice 
of Reply).
109
 In cases in which the Adjudicator determines that the Notice of Adjudication does not 
satisfy the formal requirements, that the alternative means have not been previously exhausted by the 
parties, or that Ofcom may be appropriate to handle the dispute under the provisions of Section 186 of 
the UK Communications Act, the Adjudicator will decline to hear the dispute. Should none of the 
above apply, the Adjudicator will examine the parties’ submissions together with the supporting 
documents and issue its determination ordinarily within twenty working days from the date of the 
submission of the Notice of Reply.
110
 The decision of the Adjudicator is—in principle—final and 
binding upon the parties. Even at this final stage, however, the Adjudicator may refuse to provide for a 
binding solution and encourage the parties to enter into commercial negotiations.   
 A similar but somewhat simplified adjudication scheme was established for the Office of 
Adjudicator for disputes between Carlton-Granada and its advertising customers with regard to 
the Contract Rights Renewal (CRR) Remedy. The CRR Adjudicator was established following the 
CC’s decision of May 12, 2004 on the merger of Carlton and Granada, two companies engaged in the 
selling of television airtime, a merger that was permitted based on the condition that these companies 
subject themselves to new regulatory obligations called CRR Remedy.
111
 The CRR Remedy was to 
protect the rights of other companies falling within the ITV group and it involved both the advertisers, 
                                                     
103 See the introductory note available on OTA-BTS’s website at: http://adjudicator-bts.org.uk  
104 Ibid. 
105 See: The Undertakings available at: http://adjudicator-bts.org.uk/documents/Undertakings%20-%20Non-
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106 Ofcom’s News Release of September 12, 2008 available at: http://media.ofcom.org.uk/news/2008/ofcom-appoints-
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107 See specifically Section 13 of the Undertakings. 
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109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid. 
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who enter into agreements with the broadcasters directly, and media buyers, who conclude the sale 
contracts related to commercial airtime indirectly, that is, on behalf of the advertisers.
112
  
 As compared to the OTA-BTS Adjudication Scheme, the major variation of the CRR 
Adjudicator concerns the content of the decisions to be made by the CRR Adjudicator. Usually, the 
CRR Adjudicator will issue its decision pronouncing either “yes” or “no” with regard to the 
determination of whether Carlton or Granada acted fairly and reasonably in relation to its customers.
113
 
The decision will state its reasons whenever appropriate.
114
 Moreover, the decisions of the CRR 
Adjudicator are not final, as the Adjudicator may consider it appropriate for the parties to submit an 
appeal against such decisions to Ofcom.
115
 Alternatively, the parties may rely on their original contract 
or refuse to proceed with the execution of the said contract, should the contractual provisions that have 
been agreed to provide for such solutions.
116
 
 The examples of the delegated regulatory adjudication as analysed above attest to a strong 
regulatory supervision (exercised by Ofcom) of somewhat less formal procedures established for the 
resolution of certain types of regulatory disputes in the UK. All three Adjudication Schemes presented 
above resemble a form of expert proceedings aiming at facilitating the parties conduct in an official 
manner. The delegated adjudicators act in conformity with Ofcom’s guidelines for resolving disputes, 
and they should by no means be compared to mediators or arbitrators acting in traditional, commercial 
dispute resolution proceedings. What is important, however, concerns the fact that delegated 
adjudication schemes in all three cases encourage the use of ADR mechanisms by the parties, which 
should usually take the form of commercial negotiations. Moreover, the last of the studied schemes, 
namely, the CRR Adjudication Scheme, entails an interesting combination of private-public 
enforcement of commercial obligations of the parties to the agreements involving the sale of airtime. 
The CRR Adjudicator has the authority to determine the appeal procedure against its own decisions by 
means of allowing the parties to either submit their appeal to Ofcom or to rely on private contract 
enforcement should the provisions of commercial contract provide for such a solution. The last 
observation is particularly relevant given that the commercial contracts over the sale of airtime (or 
over advertising) still remain within the scope of regulatory contracts that have the potential to distort 
competition between the advertisers, broadcasters and media buyers. This would suggest that 
delegated regulatory adjudication does not necessarily concern only less relevant types of regulatory 
disputes but that it also allows private enforcement means for the sake of securing certain public 
service broadcasting obligations, as determined within the meaning of the provisions contained in 
commercial contracts.        
ADR 
 
As the examination of Ofcom’s policy in assessing the appropriateness of ADR for the resolution of 
the referred disputes was analysed in the preceding part of this paper, it is now sufficient only to 
present both the historical treatment of ADR by Ofcom given certain objectives of the 
telecommunications disputes and Ofcom’s plausible preferences with regard to the outsourcing of 
disputes to the existent private, alternative fora. Already Ofcom’s predecessor, Oftel, in its joint 
statement of February 28, 2003 prepared with the Radiocommunications Agency on ‘Dispute 
Resolution under the new EU Directives’ (Oftel’s Statement) analysed the suitability of certain types 
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of disputes to ADR.
117
  Oftel set up a framework in line with Ofcom’s current policy to decide on the 
applicability of alternative means to regulatory disputes. It stated that:  
 
ADR should be used to resolve disputes between operators which are not dominant, even if there 
is a disparity in commercial size and bargaining power between the firms involved. In such cases, 
in the absence of SMP, there should nevertheless be an incentive for commercial sensible 
outcomes to emerge through a normal process of negotiation.
118
 
 
It is unclear to the author whether Oftel considered “a normal process of negotiation” as falling within 
the range of available alternative means. The subsequent section of Oftel’s Statement, that is devoted 
exclusively to ADR, suggests the contrary. In any case, Oftel noticed that the success of ADR was 
dependent on the incentives of the parties involved in amicable processes.
119
 However, Oftel clarified 
the practical considerations to be taken into account on a case-by-case basis when assessing the 
significance of ADR in regulatory disputes. The table below illustrates Oftel’s concerns in this regard.  
Figure 4: Examples of factors influencing the decision to decline to resolve a dispute by 
Oftel 
            
 
Oftel’s policy objectives regarding its determinations of the suitability of ADR, as included in the 
table, were based on the following considerations: (1) the dispute did not involve a large number of 
parties; (2) both parties were dominant; (3) none of the parties were dominant; (4) similar disputes 
were resolved in other industries without the NRA’s intervention; and finally (5) there existed an 
evidenced plausibility that the parties had not made sufficient attempts to enter into commercial 
negotiations. Moreover, in its Statement, Oftel observed that parties with equal bargaining powers are 
more akin to reach a commercial agreement as a result of commercial negotiations. These dynamics 
are illustrated in the figure below. 
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Figure 5: Where market power is equal, parties may be more likely to reach commercial 
agreement 
     
 
Oftel’s Statement did not specify what types of ADR the parties might potentially enter into, except 
from commercial negotiations. It is important to note, however, Oftel’s reluctance to create a separate 
body within its organizational structure that would have been responsible for the resolution of disputes 
by means of ADR. This reluctance can be explained in consideration of the principle of economic 
efficiency, especially in view of the small percentage of disputes that Oftel found suitable for ADR in 
the two years preceding the issuance of the Statement.
120
  
The similar policy seems to stay in line with the current Ofcom’s approach to ADR. Ofcom’s 
Guidelines of 2011 give some indications on the forms of ADR to be applied to telecommunications 
disputes in addition to the possible private ADR fora considered appropriate in handling regulatory 
disputes. Ofcom mentions mediation and arbitration as potential ADR mechanisms. Moreover, Ofcom 
points to a long tradition of institutions and organizations offering ADR services such as the Centre for 
Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR) or the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators (CIArb). As reads from 
footnote 9 of Ofcom’s Guidelines of 2011, Ofcom is not in a position to prefer one of the available 
dispute resolution services over another. Further, Ofcom’s reference to specific ADR institutions 
should only serve as a guidance to the parties and should not be interpreted as an attempt to affect the 
parties’ choices related to their reliance on a particular ADR regime. There are a number of prominent 
arbitral institutions (also providing mediation services) such as the London Court of International 
Arbitration (LCIA), the already mentioned International Court of Arbitration at the ICC, or the 
Arbitration Institute at the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), that could potentially be used by 
the telecommunications industry. The Statistics of those institutions do not prove, however, that these 
institutions are being regularly referred to in the resolution of telecommunications disputes in practice.  
Somewhat more generous information on the institutional involvement in telecommunications 
disputes was provided by the CIArb. Gregory Hunt, the Manager of Dispute Resolution Services at 
CIArb, in his presentation of September 2, 2004 delivered at the ITU premises in Geneva, pointed to 
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the continued collaboration of CIArb with various UK communications companies since the 1970’s.121 
These companies included: Ntl, C&W, CCA, BT, Vodafone, Kingston Communications, Manx 
Telecom, Orange, O2, and Royal Mail.
122
 Moreover, Gregory Hunt explained the then confirmed 
dispute resolution solutions to be adopted by UK businesses including: (1) BT to resort to mediation 
and adjudication to resolve credit vetting disputes; (2) Vodafone to use mediation and adjudication in 
the context of interconnection disputes; and (3) UKCTA members to resolve any commercial disputes 
by means of mediation or adjudication.
123
 At the time when the presentation was delivered, CIArb was 
also conducting discussions with Orange and two other UK market players to use CIArb services for 
the resolution of interconnection disputes.
124
 The facts presented by Gregory Hunt suggest that 
mediation and adjudication are more preferred dispute resolution mechanisms by the UK 
communications undertakings, especially as opposed to arbitration.  
Gregory Hunt explained this fact by way of presenting the advantages of mediation and 
“unofficial” adjudication that were not governed by law (such as arbitration), thus, allowing the parties 
more flexibility. Additionally, he indicated that this preference was due to the possibility of a 
subsequent referral of a dispute to NRA, should the ADR methods not offer satisfactory outcomes. 
CIArb is a dispute resolution provider known worldwide for its commitment to diligent professional 
conduct and for its role in training neutral parties to assume extensive expertise in specific types of 
disputes. This, in conjunction with the existence of CIArb’s public Code of Ethics for practitioners and 
broad disciplinary powers of CIArb vis-à-vis its members makes it attractive for UK 
telecommunication market players.
125
 Some commentators argue that, although CIArb’s dispute 
resolution scheme can be relevant for a prompt and flexible resolution of disputes between the 
companies that do not hold SMP, CIArb has no practical authority to shape the UK 
telecommunications market in a way similar to Ofcom.
126
    
 
Appeals against Ofcom’s decisions and the principles of private law 
 
Although a detailed analysis of the appeal processes against Ofcom’s determinations falls outside the 
scope of this paper, it is sufficient to briefly refer here to two judgments of the CAT, in which it 
reflected on Ofcom’s assessment of its jurisdiction both in front of the contractual obligations of the 
parties and the availability of alternative means for dispute resolution. These decisions are crucial as 
they reflect on the plausible obligation of Ofcom to interpret the content of the terms and conditions of 
the parties‘ contracts when determining if it is appropriate to handle a dispute under Section 185 of the 
UK Communications Act.  
 
  The first decision was issued by CAT in Orange Personal Communications Services Ltd 
v Ofcom [2007] CAT 36.
127
 The judgement on the preliminary issues was rendered as a consequence 
of CAT’s preceding Order dated November 6, 2007 following the appeal against Ofcom’s 
determination of its jurisdiction under Section 185 of the UK Communications Act dated February 9, 
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2007. The CAT was to determine whether Ofcom’s decision to accept its jurisdiction in a dispute 
referred to it by BT did not exceed the statutory grounds on which Ofcom determined whether it is 
appropriate for it to handle the dispute. The dispute in question concerned wholesale mobile call 
termination rates imposed by the Appellant (Orange) to BT. Leaving aside the ambiguities of the 
appeal, it is relevant to describe the contractual relationship between the parties involved in the 
dispute, that raised certain objections on the side of Orange on the proper determination by Ofcom of 
the word “dispute“ under the parties‘ contractual arrangements. BT and Orange were parties to a 
contract called BT’s Standard Interconnection Agreement (SIA).128 Orange alleged that there was no 
dispute between the parties as determined by Ofcom, because, inter alia, BT had not exhausted the 
dispute resolution mechanism set out in the SIA.
129
 In other words, Orange argued that once the 
interconnection was established, Ofcom was not in a position to intervene in the pending commercial 
negotiations between the parties in relation to the contractual terms and conditions under which the 
interconnection was founded.
130
 Orange also questioned Ofcom’s broad interpretation of the Access 
and Interconnection Directive on the basis that it distorted the proper understanding of the regulatory 
powers of NRAs under the EU Telecom Package. Ofcom, as alleged by Orange, only had the authority 
to ensure that the interconnection was established and not to resolve “commercial disputes as to the 
terms on which interconnection [was] provided unless the dispute [threatened] the continued provision 
of the access.”131 Ofcom, on the contrary, argued that the interpretation of the provisions contained in 
the Access and Interconnection Directive should be broader. The CAT rejected the Appellant’s view, 
and confirmed that Ofcom could not determine whether a dispute existed between the parties based on 
the contractual provisions agreed on by the parties. The CAT stated that: “the private law 
consequences of a failure by one or both parties to comply with the contractual provisions are not a 
matter for the Tribunal to determine and cannot affect the statutory jurisdiction conferred on 
OFCOM.”132 Moreover, in Section 101 of the judgment in question, CAT acknowledged that: 
The fact that OFCOM as a matter of good practice encourages parties to a potential dispute to 
explore fully the possibility of resolving their differences first, is a very different matter from 
holding that OFCOM’s jurisdiction depends on contractual dispute resolution mechanisms having 
been exhausted.  
A similar reasoning was adopted in the second judgement of CAT, namely, in British 
Telecommunications v Ofcom [2011] CAT 15.
133
 In the appeal at hand, BT also challenged the 
determinations made by Ofcom under Section 185 of the UK Communications Act.
134
 In addition to 
the similar allegation raised in the aforementioned judgement, that is that Ofcom decided to hear a 
non-existent dispute between the parties, BT argued that if such disputes were proper disputes under 
the UK Communications Act, Ofcom should have declined its jurisdiction because the ADR 
mechanisms were available for the resolution of those disputes.
135
 Aside from the facts of the case, it is 
necessary to consider the CAT’s reasoning regarding the possible significance of the contractual 
provisions contained in the agreement between the parties in terms of Ofcom’s determination of its 
jurisdiction. In the present case, BT argued that the allegations raised in Orange should apply to a 
pending appeal. The CAT rejected such argumentation and reaffirmed the principles established in 
Orange. The CAT agreed with Ofcom’s claim, namely, that the fact that further commercial 
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negotiations might have been still possible was not inconsistent with the existence of a dispute as 
such.
136
 Moreover, BT argued that the dispute—even if found by Ofcom to be a proper dispute 
between the parties—should have been declined by Ofcom because ADR mechanisms (such as the 
continued commercial negotiations) were available. Ofcom together with the Interveners claimed that 
ADR for the purpose of Section 186(3) of the UK Communications Act should be interpreted as 
meaning arbitration or other formal ADR mechanisms rather than negotiations and that negotiation 
alone would require additional, future “trigger” to advance the resolution of a dispute.137 In any event, 
Ofcom was of the opinion that the determination on the availability of ADR together with the 
likelihood that ADR would contribute to a prompt and effective resolution of the dispute fell within 
Ofcom’s regulatory powers. The CAT did not reflect on these divergent interpretations of the 
provisions of Section 186(3) of the UK Communications Act, but the appeal was rejected on different 
grounds that fall outside of the scope of the present analysis. 
  The above judgements of the CAT are significant for a comprehensive understanding of 
Ofcom’s approach to ADR while exercising its regulatory functions including dispute resolution. The 
CAT, in both judgements, confirmed the broad discretion of Ofcom in deciding the admissibility of 
each particular dispute both in consideration of the possible contrary contractual terms and conditions 
related to the parties’ will regarding the design of their dispute resolution as well as the actual 
availability and suitability of ADR for the resolution of regulatory disputes. It is clear that, in some 
cases, commercial negotiations may be used by recalcitrant parties to obstruct dispute resolution 
processes, but the arbitrariness of Ofcom in determining its jurisdiction implies important issues 
related to the principles of party autonomy in using alternative means for the resolution of contractual 
disagreements. Also, the understanding of ADR by Ofcom raises questions regarding the significance 
of commercial negotiations and other less official mechanisms such as conciliation or facilitation in 
the preliminary resolution of regulatory disputes. Are more formal mechanisms including increasingly 
formalized arbitration a real alternative for the communications operators to the formal adjudication 
proceedings conducted by Ofcom? This question will be addressed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3 of this 
paper. 
Ireland 
 
In Ireland, the regulatory powers for the resolution of telecommunications disputes between 
undertakings were conferred on the Commission for Communications Regulation (ComReg).
138
 
ComReg is a converged regulation body responsible for shaping the electronic communications 
sectors as a whole including telecommunications, radiocommunications, and broadcasting, as well as 
the postal service.
139
  
 
The functions of ComReg are enumerated in Section 10(1) of the Irish Communications 
Regulation Act of 2002, as amended by the Communications Regulation (Amendment) Act of 2007 
(the Irish Communications Regulation Act).
140
 ComReg also exercises functions under the 
Miscellaneous Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
141
 Section 10(1)(d) of the Irish 
Communications Regulation Act states that ComReg is in particular responsible for the investigation 
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of complaints from undertakings [and consumers] regarding the supply of, and access to, electronic 
communications services, electronic communications networks and associated facilities and 
transmission of such services on these networks. Additionally, Section 12(1)(a) of the Irish 
Communications Regulation Act establishes the objectives of ComReg in relation to the provision of 
electronic communications networks, electronic communications services and associated facilities. 
These objectives concern the following: (1) the promotion of competition, (2) the contribution to the 
development of the internal market, and (3) the promotion of the interests of users within the 
Community.   
   
 Regarding dispute resolution functions, the Irish Communications Regulation Act specifically 
refers to disputes arising out of or in connection with the physical infrastructure shared by 
infrastructure providers.
142
 Section 57(2) of the Irish Communications Regulation Act confirms a right 
of a network operator to negotiate an agreement to share physical infrastructure with other 
infrastructure providers, as well as the right of a network operator to serve notice on ComReg of 
negotiation upon the commencement of any such negotiation. In cases in which agreement is not 
reached within the period specified by ComReg, ComReg should take necessary steps to resolve the 
dispute in accordance with the procedures established and maintained by it. Moreover, the Irish 
Communications Regulation Act, in Section 55(5), also points to disputes between a network operator 
and a road authority in respect of the cost of the relocation of electronic communications 
infrastructure. Such disputes should be decided by agreed conciliation procedures or by arbitration 
under the Arbitration Acts, 1954 to 1998, as recently amended by the Arbitration Act of 2010 (in cases 
where the parties did not enter into an agreement providing for conciliation).  
 
 The functions of ComReg were substantially broadened under the Communications 
Regulation (Amendment) Act of 2007. ComReg was authorized to initiate investigations on its own 
initative in cases concerning prospective abuse of market powers by the undertakings.
143
 Moreover, if 
ComReg believes that an undertaking has abused a dominant position, via the 2007 Act, it has gained 
the authority to prove such abuse in the Courts.
144
 
ComReg’s dispute resolution functions are enumerated in Section 31 of the European 
Communities (Electronic Communications Networks and Services (Framework) Regulations 2003, as 
amended by the European Communities (Electronic Communications Networks and Services) 
(Framework) (Amendment) Regulations 2007 (Framework Regulations).
145
 Section 31 of the 
Framework Regulations defines a “dispute” broadly, meaning each dispute between undertakings that 
arises in connection with the EU Telecom Package, the present Framework Regulations or the Specific 
Regulations. The process to be followed by ComReg in the resolution of regulatory disputes mirrors 
the major objectives of the European communications framework as established in the EU Telecom 
Package. This means that ComReg should decide a dispute within the shortest time possible, not 
exceeding four months from the day the dispute was lodged with ComReg. Moreover, ComReg should 
enjoy broad discretion in both designing its dispute resolution procedures and in determining whether 
it is appropriate to handle a dispute given the availability of ADR means.  
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We necessarily proceed now to examine the procedures established by ComReg for the 
resolution of disputes between undertakings. Such procedures will be analysed within the two 
following categories: (1) regulatory adjudication, and (2) ADR.  
Regulatory adjudication 
The resolution of formal disputes between undertakings is conducted by ComReg’s Compliance 
Team.
146
 ComReg’s recent dispute resolution practice is based on the provisions contained in 
ComReg’s Dispute Resolution Procedures - Framework Regulations of March 29, 2010 (Response to 
Consultation Document No. 09/85) (ComReg’s Dispute Resolution Procedures of 2010).147 The formal 
regulatory adjudication process begins from the day of the receipt by ComReg of a Dispute 
Submission that should correspond to the formal requirements as set out in Annex C to ComReg’s 
Dispute Resolution Procedures of 2010. ComReg will determine if it is appropriate to hear or decline 
the dispute based on the following considerations: (1) that there is a disagreement between the parties 
that constitutes the basis for the dispute, (2) that negotiation has taken place between the parties but 
has failed (or that one party undertook reasonable steps to engage the other party in negotiation), (3) 
that the dispute is between undertakings as defined in Regulation 2 of the Framework Regulations, and 
finally (4) that the nature of the dispute is material and that it arose out of the obligations established 
in the EU Telecom Package, the Framework Regulations and other Specific Regulations.
148
    
 If, based on the above considerations, ComReg considers itself as the appropriate forum to 
handle the dispute, it will further investigate whether other ADR means are not available for the 
resolution of the dispute, or if the parties are not engaged in the pending legal proceedings. If this is 
the case, ComReg will decline to hear the dispute and will duly inform the parties of its decision in 
this regard. Since the analysis of ComReg’s application of ADR will be analysed in the following part 
of this paper, it is relevant to simply highlight here ComReg’s position on ADR in response to the 
consultations conducted prior to issuing ComReg’s Dispute Resolution Procedures of 2010. ComReg’s 
position revolves around the following statement: 
When considering whether other means of resolving a dispute in a timely manner are available to 
the parties ComReg will consider inter alia mediation, dispute resolution processes in commercial 
agreements between operators, resolution by adjudication, informal contacts or negotiation; 
discussion at industry fora, and ComReg own initiative investigations.
149
 
This declaration does not necessarily specify the grounds to be taken into account by ComReg in 
assessing the suitability of ADR to each particular dispute. It is, however, noteworthy as it points to 
ComReg’s preferred ADR mechanisms comprising: mediation, private dispute resolution processes in 
commercial agreements between operators (contrary to the consideration of ComReg’s UK 
counterpart, Ofcom), adjudications, informal means such as contacts and negotiation, discussion at 
industry fora and investigations initiated by ComReg itself.     
If, ComReg decides to accept its jurisdiction over a dispute, it will inform the parties and 
expect the Respondent to submit its detailed response within ten working days. Even at this stage, 
ComReg may decide to decline a dispute if it finds that ADR mechanisms will be more suitable for the 
resolution of a dispute. In any case, ComReg may invite the parties to submit further supporting 
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documents and more details regarding their dispute, in addition to meeting with the parties to the 
dispute either jointly or individually. Subsequently, ComReg will prepare a draft determination to 
either be published on ComReg’s website or sent privately to the parties to the dispute. Parties and the 
industry (when applicable) will be required to comment on this draft determination within ten working 
days. Eventually, ComReg will issue a Final Determination (including reasons) and provide it to the 
parties to the dispute. 
Figure 6: ComReg’s Dispute Resolution Procedures Flowchart150 
 
ADR 
 
Already in March 1999 the Office of the Director of Telecommunications Regulation (ODTR), a 
predecessor of ComReg, issued a consultation document welcoming the comments of the industry 
regarding the resolution of disputes arising in the telecommunications sector. Subsequently, in 
September 1999 ODTR published a Report entitled: “Dispute Resolution Procedures” (1999 ODTR 
Report) that summarized the results of the consultations, by means of outlining the policy of ODTR 
concerning dispute resolution in general and ADR in particular.
151
 What is important for the 
understanding of ComReg’s current support of ADR in the resolution of telecommunications disputes 
concerns the historical regulatory support of mediation and facilitation in Ireland. Stemming from a 
decision outlined in a 1999 ODTR Report, mediation and facilitation services were to be made 
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available to parties to a dispute.
152
 This decision stipulated that a mediation agreement was to be 
entered into by the parties voluntarily in accordance with the Terms of Reference of Mediation issued 
by ODTR.
153
 Additionally, a facilitator was to be appointed by ODTR within ten working days from 
the day of entering into the mediation agreement. The then objectives of ODTR in terms of the use of 
the above-mentioned ADR means concerned the effectiveness of ADR in reaching a fast resolution of 
a dispute.  
  
 As already noticed, also ComReg supports a number of informal dispute resolution techniques 
within its statutory approach to regulatory adjudication. ComReg’s recent Dispute Resolution 
Procedures of 2010 constitutes a noteworthy source of objectives concerning both the parties to 
potential disputes (such as operators) and the Irish NRA in terms of the application of different types 
of ADR mechanisms in the telecommunications sector. Let us start with an analysis of operator’s 
attitudes towards ADR in the telecommunications sector. 
 
  Six Respondents replied to the question posed by ComReg regarding the assessment of the 
appropriateness of various types of ADR for the resolution of a dispute when determining the 
jurisdiction by ComReg.
154
 One operator, Eircom, pointed to different commercial negotiation 
clauses contained in inter-operator agreements, and it stated that such mechanisms should be 
understood as ADR techniques for the purpose of ComReg’s determination of the suitability of ADR 
for the resolution of regulatory disputes.
155
 Eircom further noted that the existence of contractual 
commercial negotiation provisions should prevent ComReg from initiating its own investigations on 
parallel issues.
156
  
  Moreover, three out of the six Respondents identified mediation as a suitable alternative 
mechanism.
157
 However, the remaining three Respondents expressed their dissatisfaction concerning 
the costs of ADR mechanisms in that—in their view—costs should be equally borne by the parties. 
Other parties, in turn, stated that the successful party should be entitled to the costs of mediation. 
Vodafone, explained that—when deciding on the appropriateness to hear a dispute by ComReg—there 
was a need to ensure the regulatory certainty by ComReg, in view of the actual positions of the parties 
to a dispute.
158
  
  An interesting response was provided by BT that enlisted five possible ADR mechanisms to 
be considered by ComReg. These involved the following: (1) resolution by adjudication for long 
running issues, (2) fast track similar to the small claims court approach, (3) standard dispute 
(contained in Regulation 31 of the Framework Regulations dispute), (4) other routes to resolve issues 
(i.e. ComReg investigations stemming from its own initiative), and finally (5) a new regulatory 
remedies proposal.
159
  
  Another Respondent, ALTO expressed appreciation for mediation provided by ComReg or 
other experienced mediation providers.
160
 ALTO made it clear, however, that such mediation should 
not be a mandatory stage of regulatory adjudication. 
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  Finally, the last Respondent, COLT generally expressed its positive approach to informal 
negotiation or mediation.
161
 At the same time, however, it stressed that it would not support any form 
of arbitration in the case ComReg decided to assume it as its preferred method of dispute resolution. 
  When determining its own position with regard to ADR, ComReg generally agreed that 
commercial negotiations between the parties should constitute ADR mechanism to be assessed by 
ComReg when making its determination of jurisdiction.
162
 ComReg, however, did not exclude the 
possibility of conducting its parallel investigations related to the issues being subject to private 
negotiations. Furthermore, ComReg acknowledged the broad interest of the parties in mediation. It 
confirmed that mediation should be a voluntary mechanisms based on a prior agreement between the 
parties. ComReg did not find itself appropriate to determine—by default—that a successful party to 
mediation proceedings should be entitled to the costs. It pointed to the private character of mediation 
processes in which the allocation of costs between the parties should be determined on a case-by-case 
basis. Moreover, when assessing the various proposals to be included in the standard ADR procedure 
as “authorized” by ComReg made by BT, the Irish NRA acknowledged the use of resolution by 
adjudication or of other informal routes, leaving aside other ADR mechanisms proposed by BT.
163
 
ComReg argued that such other ADR mechanisms—although requiring future attention—are 
premature given the underdevelopment of ADR in the resolution of regulatory disputes in Ireland. 
Finally, ComReg did not find it appropriate to exclude arbitration from the range of ADR mechanisms 
available in the telecommunications sector vaguely pointing to the suitability of arbitration to certain 
sectorial disputes. Having noted that, however, ComReg did not include arbitration in the list of 
potentially suitable ADR means in its final position formulated as the result of the consultations.  
  In practice, mediation is one of the most developed forms of ADR offered and sponsored by 
ComReg. ComReg will usually appoint an independent external mediator within ten days from the 
moment the parties agree on mediation.
164
 ComReg also offers mediation for the resolution of cross-
border disputes if the NRAs determine that such a technique may be suitable for the prompt resolution 
of such disputes.
165
 
Poland 
In Poland the resolution of disputes between telecommunications operators falls within the exclusive 
competences of the Polish regulatory authority for the market of telecommunications and postal 
services, that is, the President of the Office of Electronic Communications (Urząd Komunikacji 
Elektronicznej - UKE).
166
 The President of UKE resolves inter-operator disputes pursuant to Article 28 
of the Polish Telecommunications Law of 16 April 2004, in accordance with the procedural rules 
explained in the Polish Code of Administrative Procedure of 14 June 1960.
167
 Inter-operator disputes 
exclusively concern disputes relating to the conclusion of telecommunications access agreements or 
the necessary modification of such agreements.
168
 In fact, the B2B telecommunications disputes in 
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Poland are determined exclusively by means of regulatory adjudication and the application of ADR to 
such disputes is only marginal. 
Regulatory adjudication 
Telecommunications Access Agreements (TAAs) between undertakings are subject to prior 
negotiations. The requirements to be met by the undertakings during such negotiations are set out in 
paragraph 3 of the Regulation of the Minister of Infrastructure on the Specific Requirements for 
Ensuring the Telecommunications Access of 21 July 2008 (the Regulation of 21 July 2008).
169
 
Pursuant to Paragraph 3 of the Regulation of 21 July 2008, telecommunications undertaking wishing 
to conclude an agreement for telecommunications access should send a written request to another 
operator for interconnection access to its network. The formal request should include, inter alia, 
technical specifications and the location of points of interconnection, the types of services provided by 
the mutual use of the telecommunications networks, the expected intensity and structure of 
interconnection traffic, and the expected date of the network connections.
170
 Undertakings that have 
received such a request may either accept the proposals contained therein within thirty working days 
or submit its own interconnection proposal to the applicant, taking into account the content of the 
previous request.  
The President of UKE resolves disputes related to telecommunications access either upon 
request of the parties involved in the negotiations for the conclusion of TAA (if any) or ex officio.
171
 In 
cases in which the negotiations were taken up, each party may submit the request to the President of 
UKE in view of specifying the time-limit for closing the negotiations for the conclusion of the 
agreement, which should not exceed ninety days from the day when such a request was submitted to 
UKE.
172
 In situations in which negotiations did not take place, were not concluded within the specified 
time-frame, or when the party obliged to ensure telecommunications access under its regulatory 
obligations refused the interconnection, any of the parties may submit a request to the President of 
UKE for “issuance of a decision resolving contentious issues or for determining the conditions of 
cooperation.”173  
Such a request should include the following information: a draft TAA; the market position of 
the parties involved, as well as an explanation of the issues with regard to which the parties were not 
able to reach a settlement. In any case, the parties should be able to submit to the President of UKE 
their mutual positions regarding the contentious matters within fourteen days upon receiving the 
request of the President of UKE.  In all these scenarios, the President of UKE reserves the right to 
issue the following decisions (1) a decision regarding the closing of the negotiations for the conclusion 
of the TAA, (2) a resolution of contentious issues, and finally (3) a decision on specific conditions of 
cooperation ex officio.   
The dispute resolution procedure set out in Article 28 of the Polish Telecommunications Law 
takes the form of a conservative regulatory adjudication in the meaning of traditional administrative 
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proceedings. The determinations of the President of UKE can be further appealed by the parties 
involved pursuant to the provisions of the Polish Administrative Code.  
The President of UKE will issue a decision within 90 days of the date of the submission of the 
request specified in Article 27(2) and (2b) of the Polish Telecommunications Law. Account must be 
taken of both the interest of telecommunications users and the content of obligations imposed on 
telecommunications undertakings. The President of UKE should, in principle, consider the technical 
and economic context of the proposals submitted by the parties engaged in the negotiation of a 
relevant TAA (when applicable). However, the Polish NRA, under the Polish Telecommunications 
Act, has no power to decline to resolve a dispute should the ADR techniques be more suitable for the 
resolution of certain regulatory disputes. The dispute resolution practices of the President of UKE aim 
at securing a strong regulatory position of the Polish NRA vis-à-vis communications undertakings, a 
function characterised by historical dynamics within the Polish telecommunications market.
174
  
As regards disputes related to the modifications in the telecommunications access agreement, 
they are governed by Articles 29 and 30 of the Polish Telecommunications Act.  Based on the 
provisions of Article 29, the procedure for the resolution of disputes related to the conclusion of 
telecommunications access agreements is also applicable to disputes that may arise between 
undertakings while modifying the scope and the content of such agreements. Moreover, the President 
of UKE may interfere with the content of telecommunications access agreements ex officio either by 
requiring the parties to modify the scope of agreement or—on its own initiative—by means of 
changing the content of a telecommunication access agreement in cases in which such modification is 
justified by the need to protect the interests of end users and to ensure effective competition or 
interoperability of services.
175
  
The decision of the President of UKE ordinarily replaces the TAA within the scope of the 
official determination. In cases where the interested parties conclude a telecommunications access 
agreement, the decision on telecommunications access shall expire by the virtue of law in the part 
covered by the agreement. The decisions of the President of UKE issued as a result of a dispute 
between telecommunications undertakings should be immediately enforceable. All decisions on 
telecommunications access may be modified by the President of UKE either at the request of the party 
involved in a dispute or on its own initiative whenever there is a need to protect the interests of end 
users and to ensure effective competition or interoperability of services by means of such decisions.
176
 
The analysis below, concerning the statistical data on the dispute resolution practice of UKE, should 
illustrate both the broad functions of the President of UKE in the promotion of the Polish 
telecommunications market and the origins of disputes that arise in connection to inter-operator 
cooperation.  
 Since the creation of UKE in 2006, the number of final determinations issued by the President 
of UKE in relation to disputes between communications undertakings has increased as a result of the 
continued regulatory strategy determined by the President of UKE. According to Figure 8 below, the 
President of UKE issued ten final determinations in 2006, while already in 2008 the number of its final 
determinations amounted to 104. Additionally, already two years after the establishing of UKE, that is, 
in 2009, the President of UKE conducted 181 administrative proceedings related to inter-operator 
cooperation and it issued 208 final determinations in this regard.
177
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177 The Report on the Telecommunications Market in Poland in 2009, prepared by the President of UKE, Warsaw, June 2010, 
available (in Polish) at: http://www.uke.gov.pl/files/?id_plik=5147.  
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As regards the content of the decisions issued by the President of UKE in 2007, the majority 
of them concerned the following disputable issues: (1) the adjustments of the inter-operators 
agreements in view of the introduction of the interconnection flat rates; (2) the modifications of the 
network interconnection agreements in view of the definitions of services and settlement rates as 
provided in RIO 2008; (3) the modifications of the conditions of the broadband transmission of data 
agreements in accordance with the framework agreement of Telekomunikacja Polska SA of 6 May 
2008; (4) the modifications of the conditions of the Bitstream Access agreements (BSA) in the context 
of the resignation from the BSA services with regard to a particular subscriber line;  and (5) the 
determination of the conditions of settlements pursuant to the Mobile Termination Rate (MTR).
178
  
The decisions of the President of UKE rendered in 2008 in conclusion of dispute resolution 
proceedings entailed the following: (1) determinations of the conditions of cooperation in the context 
of the Wholesale Line Rental (WLR); (2) the adjustments of the conditions of the network 
interconnection agreements in view of the definitions and rates as set forth in RIO of 2006; (3) the 
adjustments of the conditions of network interconnection agreements in accordance with the 
interconnection flat rates; and (4) the determination of the conditions on settlements pursuant to 
MTR.
179
  
Figure 7: Number and types of decisions of the President of UKE issued in the period 
between 2006 – 2008 
YEAR No. of Conclusive 
Decisions 
No. of Decisions 
Discontinuing the 
Proceedings 
No. of Decisions 
regarding the completion 
of negotiations for the 
conclusion of the 
agreement 
2006
180
 10 18 26 
2007
181
 38 17 38 
2008
182
 104 24 86 
Although statistical data regarding the number of decisions of the President of UKE issued after the 
year 2008 is rather scarce, it is sufficient to note that the substantial amount of decisions rendered prior 
to this date can be explained by means of the particular dynamics of the then emerging Polish 
telecommunications market that required a heavy-handed regulatory supervision of the President of 
UKE. According to the interviewees, a substantial amount of disputes between telecommunications 
undertakings in Poland between the year 2006 and 2008 resulted from the then uncertainty that 
characterised the negotiation process of early communications framework agreements between 
operators.
183
 Most disputes related to the conclusion of these framework agreements required 
regulatory intervention of the President of UKE to minimise any potential regulatory uncertainty and 
enhance market competition.
184
 The situation changed somewhat with the appointment of Ms. 
                                                     
178 The Report on the Telecommunications Market in Poland in 2007, prepared by the President of UKE, Warsaw, April 
2008, available (in Polish) at: http://www.uke.gov.pl/files/?id_plik=3233.   
179 The Report on the Telecommunications Market in Poland in 2009, prepared by the President of UKE. 
180 The Report on the Telecommunications Market in Poland in 2006, prepared by UKE, August 2007, available (in Polish) 
at: http://www.uke.gov.pl/files/?id_plik=1751.  
181 The Report on the Telecomunications Market in Poland in 2007, prepared by UKE.   
182 The Report on the Telecommunications Market in Poland in 2009, prepared by the President of UKE. 
183 Phone interviews with Professor Stanisław Piątek and Marek Konior of conducted by the author on March 31, 2014 and 
December 19, 2013, respectively.   
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Magdalena Gaj as the new President of UKE, who adopted a less interventionist regulatory model 
when exercising her functions.  
One important factor that minimised the early adversarial nature of the Polish 
telecommunication market (and contributed to the subsequent decrease in the amount of regulatory 
disputes between communications undertakings) concerned the Settlement between the former 
President of UKE, Ms. Anna Strezynska, and the then Telekomunikacja Polska SA (currently Orange 
Poland), a company with a dominant market power, of 2009.  
In view of both the necessity for the improvement of the cooperation between the so-called 
alternative operators in Poland and the advancement of the new principles of the Polish 
telecommunications market the then President of UKE, Ms. Anna Strezynska, on  October 22, 2009 
concluded a Settlement with the President of the then Telekomunikacja Polska SA, Mr. Maciej Witucki 
(the Settlement). There are at least a few relevant implications of the Settlement for the present 
discussion. First, the Settlement regulated the resolution of the then pending disputes between the 
President of UKE and Telekomunikacja Polska SA by way of establishing a new procedure for the 
resolution of these disputes that resembled a form of amicable dispute resolution technique. Second, 
the settlement imposed an obligation on Telekomunikacja Polska SA according to which it was 
supposed to withdraw from all its then pending court proceedings against alternative operators in 
Poland.  
 
Regarding the first issue, the Settlement, in Paragraph 14, set out a procedure for the 
resolution of disputes arising in the context of the Settlement or out of the performance of the 
Settlement. The procedure provided for the creation of a Steering Committee consisting of the 
Directors of the Project as well as the persons indicated by both the President of UKE and the 
President of Telekomunikacja Polska SA. The Steering Committee was to issue its majority decisions 
in writing in conclusion of each dispute, or by means of recommendations directed towards either 
parties to a dispute. Dispute resolution procedure as established in the Settlement is noteworthy as it 
constituted isolated provisions allowing for the potential application of a specific ADR mechanism for 
the resolution of disputes within the Polish telecommunications market.   
 
Concerning the withdrawal from the pending court proceedings by Telekomunikacja Polska 
SA, we should recall the provision of Article 28.7 of the Polish Telecommunications Law that states 
that the cases in connection to pursuing property rights as a result of non-performance or inadequate 
performance of obligations resulting from the decision on telecommunications access are subject to 
judicial proceedings. Prior to the Settlement, a number of disputes were initiated by Telekomunikacja 
Polska SA against alternative operators in civil and administrative courts. The majority of these cases 
related to the execution of payments in the context of telecommunications services.
185
 In accordance 
with Paragraph 12 of the Settlement, Telekomunikacja Polska SA agreed on the effective resolution of 
disputes with both the President of UKE and alternative operators by means of the withdrawal of both 
all appeals previously initiated and all claims filed against the NRA and alternative operators. 
According to the commentators and in view of the Report of the President of UKE related to the 
execution of the Settlement of 22 October 2009, prepared in Warsaw in October 2011, already two 
years following the conclusion of the Settlement, all pending disputes were successfully withdrawn by 
Telekomunikacja Polska SA.
186
 What is more, the amount of new disputes decreased with regard to the 
settlements concluded by alternative operators and Telekomunikacja Polska SA at the request of the 
former. Those settlements established new conditions of cooperation between Telekomunikacja Polska 
SA and other telecommunications undertakings, which minimised the emergence of new disputes in 
the context of such cooperation agreements.       
                                                     
185 For the full list of litigations, visit: http://www.uke.gov.pl/files/?id_plik=6284  
186 The Report of the President of UKE related to the execution of the Settlement of 22 October 2009, prepared in Warsaw in 
October 2011 is available in Polish at: http://www.uke.gov.pl/files/?id_plik=9461.  
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The marginal use of ADR 
 
There is little evidence—at least to the knowledge of the author—on the applicability of ADR 
mechanisms to B2B disputes within the Polish telecommunications market.
187
 Certain framework 
agreements available on the website of UKE include provisions referring to negotiation or conciliation 
procedures. These agreements concern: (1) the framework access agreement concerning full and 
shared access to local loop, and (2) the framework leased line agreement.
188
 Both agreements include 
reference to ADR in addition to the availability of court proceedings or the possible submission of a 
dispute to regulatory adjudication conducted by UKE. To this extent, there is no evidence of a general 
applicability of ADR to telecommunications disputes in Poland.  
2.2. What forms of ADR Are Applied within the Studied Jurisdictions? Is ADR in 
Telecommunications Markets a “Real” ADR? 
 
The analysis of the national regulatory approaches to ADR in the UK, Ireland and Poland attests to the 
divergence among various NRAs regarding the assessment of suitability of ADR techniques for the 
resolution of regulatory disputes in the telecommunications sectors. The following conclusions emerge 
with regard to this examination. 
 
 From a vertical, national perspective, different NRAs tend to express their preferences for 
certain types of ADR techniques that usually fall within the standard regulatory functions in assessing 
the appropriateness of NRAs to resolve or decline a dispute. Hence, Ofcom in the UK points to more 
official ADR methods such as arbitration or formal alternative proceedings when explaining the 
possible range of dispute resolution methods available to the parties as opposed to Ofcom’s regulatory 
adjudication. Additionally, the presentation of Gregory Hunt, a Manager of Dispute Resolution 
Services at CIArb, as examined in Section 2.1 of this paper, proves the applicability of mediation and 
to some extent “unofficial” adjudication for disputes between the major UK telecommunications 
market players. It also emerges from Ofcom’s ordinary policy regarding the preliminary assessment of 
its jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis that commercial negotiations between the parties may not 
always be classified as a formal ADR mechanism, especially as long as the plausible obstruction of 
such negotiations by a recalcitrant party comes into play. Certainly, Ofcom developed noteworthy 
mechanisms distinguished in this paper under the term “delegated regulatory adjudication” and 
which proved relevant for the following regulatory disputes: (1) disputes concerning LLU, (2) disputes 
between Carlton-Granada and its advertising customers with regard to the Contract Rights Renewal 
(CRR) Remedy, and (3) the disputes relating to the Broadcast Transmission Services. These 
mechanisms—entailing different Adjudication Schemes in each particular case—shift between formal 
regulatory adjudication and ADR. This is so because they involve strong regulatory supervision of 
behalf Ofcom, on one hand, while resembling the work of a neutral party, on the other. In sum, the 
application of ADR in the UK falls within the broad discretion of Ofcom, and is exercised in a 
conservative manner, hence, not allowing the operators much autonomy regarding their choice of 
preferred ADR method. This is not to say that Ofcom is not supportive when it comes to the parties’ 
use of ADR. Rather, the operators’ will to rely on specific, private ADR mechanisms will always need 
to be assessed by Ofcom in terms of its suitability for a regulatory dispute, and as such it may be 
circumvented by Ofcom’s decisions on the appropriateness of another dispute resolution procedure for 
the pending case. 
 
                                                     
187 On the contrary, telecommunications disputes involving consumers are resolved through arbitration court attached to 
UKE.  
188 See the framework access agreement concerning full and shared access to local loop via: 
http://www.uke.gov.pl/files/?id_plik=4084 and the framework leased line agreement via: 
http://www.bip.uke.gov.pl/_gAllery/49/52/4952.pdf. 
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 It seems that ComReg in Ireland adopted a less interventionist approach to ADR. ComReg has 
preferences towards the following ADR mechanisms: mediation; dispute resolution processes in 
commercial agreements between operators; resolution by adjudication; informal contacts or 
negotiation; discussion at industry fora; and ComReg own initiative investigations.
189
  It is 
important to stress here that ComReg is particularly concerned about the voluntarily nature of the 
ADR mechanism to be applied to regulatory disputes. The most frequent ADR mechanism relied upon 
by ComReg, namely, mediation, will always be based on the parties prior agreement and will respect 
the parties’ private arrangements regarding the costs of mediation. Additionally, ComReg tends to 
support the private dispute resolution mechanisms included in commercial contracts between operators 
in contrast to the norm in terms of Ofcom’s regulatory adjudication. It is interesting that ComReg, in 
its consultations on the Dispute Resolution Procedures of 2010, did not exclude the possibility of 
arbitrating certain categories of regulatory disputes given the prospective suitability of arbitration to 
resolve such disputes.
190
 ComReg did not, however, explain in detail what kind of disputes would be 
in fact appropriate for the arbitration forum.  
 
 As compared to Ofcom and ComReg, the President of UKE in Poland did not develop any 
mechanism that would encourage operators to rely on ADR. This is a function of a particular (less 
favourable) national approach to ADR that deserves broader discussion here. Both the UK and Ireland 
provide examples of jurisdictions in which arbitration and ADR have had a long history of success. In 
Poland, on the contrary, ADR mechanisms are still not preferred dispute resolution methods. This, as 
confronted with the specific dynamics of the emerging telecommunications market (as in the case of 
Poland), may justify the distrustful attitude of the Polish NRA towards the applicability of ADR to 
telecommunications disputes. What is important to note here, however, involves the fact that Ofcom, 
although operating within the hospitable ADR framework supported by different policy statements of 
public authorities and judicial decisions, does not seem to fully recognise the potential of ADR in 
regulatory disputes.
191
 This may be so because of Ofcom’s concern related to the possible 
fragmentation of regulatory functions in relation to highly sensitive public policy issues that arise in 
the telecommunications sector. Regardless of the actual objective of Ofcom to retain its broad 
regulatory functions in dispute resolution, Ofcom’s policy in assessing ADR provokes intriguing 
questions especially vis-à-vis strong public support for ADR in the UK. 
 
 Another observation regarding the application of ADR in the studied telecommunications 
markets concerns the more horizontal, systemic understanding of ADR in the regulatory sectors. The 
question to be addressed here concerns the issue of whether the ADR mechanisms as examined in the 
selected jurisdictions in fact resemble real ADR techniques that are traditionally applied in private, 
commercial settings. This question is relevant also for getting a better picture of the potential role of 
NRAs in stimulating the obligations of telecommunications undertakings under the terms and 
conditions of the commercial contracts such undertakings are bound by.  
 
A general trend can be identified, at least with regard to jurisdictions which allow the use of 
ADR in telecommunications disputes such as the UK and Ireland, concerning the distinction between 
official, unofficial and hybrid ADR that emerged in the telecommunications markets. Official ADR 
involves arbitration; unofficial ADR concerns traditional private ADR means such as mediation, 
adjudication, negotiation or conciliation; while a hybrid ADR involves some form of delegated 
regulatory adjudication. Moreover, there seems to be a further distinction within the very category of 
unofficial ADR between less formal and more formal ADR schemes.  Such distinctions do not follow 
a clear reasoning of NRAs. On one hand, in the case of the UK, Ofcom allows the use of ADR by the 
communications undertakings in a dispute that does not involve a significant imbalance of market 
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power, but it also allows the use of ADR in the enforcement of limited commercial obligations of the 
parties. On the other hand, ComReg in Ireland provides for mediation without a proper distinction 
between the category of disputes or undertakings that are more likely to be suitable for ADR. This 
confusion suggests that even unofficial ADR in the context of telecommunications regulation does not 
entirely correspond with the objectives of traditional ADR methods. This is so because in most cases 
NRA will be an ultimate authority to resolve a dispute (as in the case of Ofcom and ComReg), and 
also due to the fact that in some events an independent mediator or adjudicator will be appointed by 
NRA (as in the case of ComReg).  
 
Finally, even the private, contractual provisions on dispute resolution contained in commercial 
contracts concluded by telecommunications undertakings fail in front of the dispute resolution 
procedures of NRAs (as in the case of Ofcom) or does not exclude a parallel regulatory investigation 
(as in the case of ComReg). This implies that ADR mechanisms understood in the context of 
regulatory adjudication are not “true” ADRs regardless of whether they are invoked with regard to 
industry-specific disputes or in commercial settings.        
2.3 The Suitability of ADR for the Telecommunications Sectors in the context of the 
objectives of the EU Telecom Package   
 
The last observation from the preceding section implies the analysis of whether traditional ADR 
mechanisms are in fact suitable for the resolution of disputes emerging in the telecommunications 
markets, specifically in the context of the objectives underpinning the introduction of ADR into the 
EU Telecom Package. We shall first summarise the goals standing behind ADR in the revised 
European framework on telecommunications as presented in Section 1.2 of this paper. 
  The major rationale behind the introduction of ADR in the telecommunications sectors under 
the EU Telecom Package involved the following: (1) flexible and fast dispute resolution of suitable 
disputes, (2) effectiveness of ADR mechanisms, and (3) the legal (regulatory) certainty related to the 
use of ADR. These are also the general advantages of the ADR techniques as advertised by most 
private ADR service providers. The fragmented application of ADR by the studied regulatory 
authorities questions, however, the significance of the above-mentioned goals related to the use of 
ADR.  
  First, although ADR techniques (be it in their official or unofficial form) are usually faster and 
less bureaucratic than court proceedings or regulatory adjudication, it is uncertain whether the 
application of ADR, in view of the broad discretion of national regulatory authorities, may in fact 
enhance faster and more effective resolution of telecommunications disputes. This is mostly due to the 
possibility of referring disputes back to NRAs and additionally to the vague guidelines, stemming 
from the EU Telecom Package, on the suitability of ADR for particular categories of 
telecommunications disputes. 
  Second, it is yet unclear if the ADR mechanisms may in fact promote regulatory certainty in 
the context of the EU common telecommunications market. As stems from the analysis of the national 
attitudes towards ADR both the understanding and application of the ADR methods is still largely 
fragmented with regard to different Member States. Although the public authorities (including various 
EU officials) tend to increasingly support ADR (including arbitration) there is insufficient signal from 
those authorities as to how such alternative methods could in fact be used in order to increase legal 
certainty within the regulated markets and the efficacy of private dispute resolution. This 
acknowledges the broad autonomy of private ADR providers in applying various ADR schemes to 
B2B telecommunications disputes that—due to the transparency issues—fall outside the public 
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scrutiny, potentially hindering the effectiveness of the EU policy goals related to the promotion of 
ADR across the EU. This is not to say that ADR is not suitable for the resolution of regulatory 
disputes of various kinds. Rather, it seems that the ADR techniques could gain more practical 
significance (and increase the effectiveness of the EU policy goals regarding ADR) if their 
introduction in the EU Telecom Package was accompanied with well-defined principles related to the 
use of ADR and/or additional safeguards that could be offered to telecommunications undertakings in 
exercising their rights to conduct regulatory disputes in a private, alternative manner. Such additional 
safeguards could involve the provisions on transparency and accountability of private ADR providers, 
which could in fact strengthen the position of these providers in front of the NRAs and national courts, 
especially in jurisdictions where the ADR culture has not yet been developed.     
Conclusion: What Does the EU Stand for with regard to ADR? Private – Public 
Interplay and the Future of ADR in the Regulated Markets  
 
The analysis of the national approaches to ADR provided in Section 2.1 attests to the continued 
fragmentation with regard to the dispute resolution procedures (including ADR) in the 
telecommunications markets within the Member States. This fragmentation stems from a heavy-
handed regulatory adjudication with no major reliance on ADR (the case of Poland) on one hand, and 
the centralized dispute resolution models permitting either official ADR schemes (the case of the UK) 
or somewhat unofficial ADR means (Ireland), on the other hand. This diversity in implementing the 
EU Telecom Package suggests a discrepancy concerning a coherent understanding of the potential of 
ADR by EU officials, on one side, and the NRAs, on the other. It is clear that the EU Telecom 
Package has not (yet) contributed to the satisfactory harmonization and unity of national 
telecommunications law, as expected at the time of issuing the EU telecommunications reforms. This 
also sheds light on mere trust in private dispute resolution procedures in the telecommunications 
markets as expressed at the EU level.  
 The EU policy regarding the effectiveness of ADR in the telecommunications disputes falls 
within the recent increased private-public dialogue on arbitration and ADR. This dialogue implies 
strong public support of ADR, at least at the European level. It also entails, however, a reluctance of 
national authorities to allocate public policy issues related to telecommunications within ADR given 
different national experiences in the field of ADR. These two trends are mutually aggravating and 
provoke intriguing questions regarding the shift towards the integration of public policy objectives 
into ADR in the EU regulatory markets. Further issues emerge in this regard. Why is the public (EU) 
trust in private ADR regimes increasing while the regulators and some regulatory actors increasingly 
contest the efficacy and efficiency of those same regimes? What are the incentives for EU officials to 
give way to ever more room for arbitration bodies in the regulatory areas? And finally, why does the 
introduction of different ADR methods in regulated markets not give rise to a debate on the procedural 
safeguards and distinctive accountability mechanisms to be applied within those regimes? These 
problems, together with the questions on the future of ADR in the EU (telecommunications) markets 
will need to be assessed in view of future developments of the dispute resolution functions of NRAs, 
potentially beyond the national borders.     
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